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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, London emerged as the forum of choice for 
“libel tourists”—strategic, often foreign, plaintiffs who bring defa-
mation1 actions in a jurisdiction with plaintiff-friendly libel laws, 
even if they and the defamatory material at issue lack a substantial 
connection with that jurisdiction.2  England’s defamation laws and 
procedures make it significantly easier for claimants to commence 
and prevail in libel actions than do the laws and procedures of many 
other countries, particularly the United States.3  As a result, English 
courts have entertained several high-profile defamation cases involv-
ing foreign parties who have only tenuous connections to England, 
such as disputes between a Saudi billionaire and a U.S. journalist;4 a 
  
 1. Defamation is an intentional tort that is defined as “[t]he act of harming the 
reputation of another by making a false statement to a third person.”  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004).  Specifically, a defamatory statement tends 
to lower the reputation of a person “in the estimation of the community or to deter 
third persons from associating or dealing with her.”  Aaron Warshaw, Note, Un-
certainty from Abroad: Rome II and the Choice of Law for Defamation Claims, 32 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 269, 269 n.1 (2006).  Defamatory meaning is defined similarly 
in England.  See, e.g., Ellen Bernstein, Comment, Libel Tourism’s Final Boarding 
Call, 20 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 205, 219 (2010). 
Modern defamation law encompasses both libel and slander.  See Michelle 
Feldman, Putting the Brakes on Libel Tourism: Examining the Effects Test as a 
Basis for Personal Jurisdiction Under New York’s Libel Terrorism Protection Act, 
31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2457, 2461 n.25 (2010).  Libel refers to defamatory publica-
tions in written form, and slander refers to “transient publications such as spoken 
words.”  RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., THE RIGHT TO SPEAK ILL: DEFAMATION, 
REPUTATION AND FREE SPEECH 18 (2006).  For the purposes of this Note, the 
terms “libel” and “defamation” will be used interchangeably. 
 2. See HARRY MELKONIAN, DEFAMATION, LIBEL TOURISM, AND THE SPEECH 
ACT OF 2010: THE FIRST AMENDMENT COLLIDING WITH THE COMMON LAW 2 
(2011); Doug Rendleman, Collecting a Libel Tourist’s Defamation Judgment?, 67 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 467, 468–69 (2010).   
 3. See infra Section II. 
 4. See Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156, [22], [73]–[75] 
(Eng.) (ordering a default judgment against a U.S. author, where only twenty-three 
copies of her allegedly libelous book had been purchased in the United Kingdom). 
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Russian businessman and a U.S. magazine;5 and a French director 
and a U.S. publisher.6  Cases like these have cemented London’s 
reputation as the “libel capital of the world.”7 
The establishment of that notorious title, reflecting the notion 
that England does not value free expression as highly as other coun-
tries, has helped ignite a movement to reform English libel laws and 
procedures.8  On March 15, 2011, the U.K. Ministry of Justice un-
veiled a draft bill entitled the Draft Defamation Act 2011,9 proposing 
a substantial overhaul of English libel laws as well as the procedures 
applied in libel actions.10  The Draft Act aims to combat the percep-
tion that England is a refuge for libel tourism by, among other re-
forms, requiring English courts to determine whether England is the 
most appropriate forum in which the action should be heard before 
exercising jurisdiction.11 
The Draft Defamation Act comes less than one year after the 
enactment of the Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Estab-
lished Constitutional Heritage (“SPEECH”) Act of 2010 in the Unit-
  
 5. See Berezovsky v. Forbes, Inc., [2000] E.M.L.R. 643 (H.L.) (appeal taken 
from Eng.) (exercising jurisdiction over U.S.-based magazine Forbes, even though 
Forbes’s U.K. circulation comprised only 0.2% of its total distribution); see also 
Daniel C. Taylor, Note, Libel Tourism: Protecting Authors and Preserving Comi-
ty, 99 GEO. L.J. 189, 194 (2010). 
 6. See Polanski v. Condé Nast Publ’ns Ltd., [2005] UKHL 10, [12] (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (exercising jurisdiction over the publisher of U.S.-based maga-
zine Vanity Fair, despite the fact that the magazine’s circulation in England and 
Wales was less than five percent of its U.S. distribution). 
 7. See Nick Clegg, Comment, An End to the Libel Farce, GUARDIAN, Mar. 16, 
2011, at 33 (“London is the number one destination for libel tourism, where for-
eign claimants bring cases against foreign defendants to [English] courts—even 
when the connection with England is tenuous at best.”); Eric Pfanner, A Fight to 
Protect Americans from British Libel Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2009, at B3. 
 8. See infra Section III. 
 9. See UNITED KINGDOM MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, DRAFT DEFAMATION BILL 
CONSULTATION PAPER CP3/11 annex a, at 6 (clause 10(1)) (March 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/consultations/docs/draft-defamation-bill-
consultation.pdf [hereinafter CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL].   
 10. Id. at 6; annex a, at 6 (clause 10(3)).  For internal consistency, all references 
to the Draft Act’s effect on English libel laws and procedures also apply to Wales. 
 11. Id. at 3; see id. annex a, at 5–6 (clause 7 of draft bill addressing actions 
brought against persons not domiciled in the United Kingdom or a Member State). 
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ed States.12  The SPEECH Act prohibits U.S. courts, both state and 
federal, from recognizing or enforcing defamation judgments ren-
dered by a foreign court unless that court applied a standard that was 
as protective of free speech as a U.S. court would have applied.13  In 
the context of libel tourism, this means that a libel tourist cannot 
force a U.S. author or publisher to comply with a foreign judgment14 
unless a U.S. court finds that the judgment comported with First 
Amendment principles. 
This Note analyzes the efficacy of the Draft Defamation Act and 
its impact on the enforcement of English defamation judgments in 
U.S. courts.  Specifically, it proposes that the Draft Act’s procedural 
clauses will effectively reduce the prevalence of libel tourism in 
England.  Moreover, this Note argues that, in light of the Draft Act’s 
reforms as well as longstanding principles of international comity, 
U.S. courts should not narrowly construe the SPEECH Act to require 
exact congruence between U.S. and English defamation laws.  Final-
ly, this Note presents evidence suggesting that England’s problem of 
libel tourism could be supplanted by the new phenomenon of privacy 
tourism.  Thus, in addition to modifying and enacting the Draft De-
famation Act, English policymakers should consider reviewing and 
possibly reforming English privacy laws. 
This Note proceeds in four sections.  Section II provides a back-
ground to issues related to libel tourism, including its prevalence in 
England and the U.S. response to it.  Section III reviews the Draft 
Defamation Act’s procedural clauses related to libel tourism.  Sec-
tion IV analyzes the Draft Act’s potential to eradicate libel tourism 
and its effect on U.S. courts’ construction and application of the 
SPEECH Act.  Section IV also proposes modifications to the Draft 
Act, including the adoption of a defamation-specific choice-of-law 
  
 12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–05 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.); see also Press 
Release, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary on H.R. 2765, H.R. 
5874 and S. 1749 (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2010/08/10/statement-press-secretary-hr-2765-hr-5874-and-s-1749. 
 13. § 4102(a). 
 14. Unless a U.S. court recognizes or enforces the foreign judgment, the U.S. 
defendant will not be required to comply with the judgment’s order, which often 
includes paying monetary damages to the foreign claimant and ceasing distribution 
of the defamatory publication.  See infra Section II.D.  
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rule.  Finally, Section V explores the interplay between English de-
famation and privacy laws, considering whether the Draft Act’s aim 
to eliminate libel tourism inadvertently opens the door to the devel-
opment of privacy tourism. 
II. BACKGROUND 
This section explores the problem of libel tourism in England,15 
beginning with a discussion of its emergence and evolution, as ex-
emplified by a sampling of libel tourism cases.  Next, it reviews the 
procedures applied in English defamation cases and compares them 
with those applied in U.S. defamation cases.  It then provides a brief 
comparison of the core differences between U.S. and English libel 
laws.  Next, it considers the chilling effect that libel tourism poses 
for free speech internationally.  Finally, it discusses the U.S. re-
sponse to libel tourism, focusing on the SPEECH Act. 
A.  Libel Tourism in London 
The phrase, “libel tourism,” was coined after several U.S. celebr-
ities sought redress in England for defamatory statements published 
in the United States.16  Actor-turned-politician Arnold Schwarzeneg-
ger was one of the first to do so; in 1990, he sued U.S. author Wendy 
Leigh in England after she alleged in an unauthorized biography that 
  
 15. Libel tourism is not a problem limited to England, and several other jurisdic-
tions have been identified as being appealing to libel tourists.  See Tara Sturtevant, 
Comment, Can the United States Talk the Talk & Walk the Walk When It Comes to 
Libel Tourism: How the Freedom to Sue Abroad Can Kill the Freedom of Speech 
At Home, 22 PACE INT’L L. REV. 269, 280–82 (2010) (discussing libel tourism in 
Singapore and Australia); see also infra note 250.  But England is clearly the lead-
ing libel-tourism destination.  See Clegg, supra note 7, at 33; Robert L. McFar-
land, Please Do Not Publish This Article in England: A Jurisdictional Response to 
Libel Tourism, 79 MISS. L.J. 617, 625–26 (2010).  This Note, therefore, limits the 
discussion of libel tourism to libel actions brought in England. 
 16. Christopher Hope, New Rules to Discourage ‘Libel Tourism’ in Britain, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), Mar. 14, 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uk 
news/8379196/New-rules-to-discourage-libel-tourism-in-Britain.html. 
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he held pro-Nazi views.17  Initially, the English courts were, for the 
most part, only available to non-English public figures like Schwar-
zenegger who could justify basing their libel actions in England by 
virtue of their “international reputations.”18  But the growth of Inter-
net publications in the 1990s “made it inevitable that publications 
would transcend international borders.”19  Accordingly, a variety of 
libel claimants “began to have more choices as to fora (and, there-
fore, substantive libel law) than they ever had before.”20  London 
soon emerged as the most popular forum.21 
During the 2000s, libel tourism in London “evolved into a cot-
tage industry dominated by international businessmen and celebri-
ties.”22  For example, in 2003, Polish-born film director Roman Po-
lanski, a resident of France, brought a defamation action against U.S. 
publishing company Condé Nast Publications, owner of the U.S.-
based magazine Vanity Fair, in London, stemming from the publica-
tion of a July 2002 article, which stated that, in 1969, Polanski had 
induced sexual favors from a Swedish model while en route to Cali-
fornia to attend the funeral of his recently murdered wife.23  Despite 
the fact that Vanity Fair’s circulation in England dwarfed in compar-
  
 17. Id.; Alex Spillius, US Law to Counter ‘Libel Tourism’ in British Courts, 
DAILY TELEGRAPH (U.K.), July 28, 2010, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ 
worldnews/northamerica/usa/7915063/US-law-to-counter-libel-tourism-in-British-
courts.html; see also WENDY LEIGH, ARNOLD: AN UNAUTHORIZED BIOGRAPHY 
(1990).  But see Bernstein, supra note 1, at 210 (noting that libel tourism existed 
well before the 1990s, citing U.S. entertainer Liberace’s 1959 English defamation 
suit against the Daily Mail as an example). 
 18. See Sarah Staveley-O’Carroll, Note, Libel Tourism Laws: Spoiling the Holi-
day and Saving the First Amendment?, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 252, 265–66 
(2009). 
 19. Feldman, supra note 1, at 2464. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See id. 
 22. Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 18, at 266.  In 2008, it was estimated that 
celebrities had filed one-third of all libel suits in England and Wales that year.  
Robert Verkaik, London Becomes Defamation Capital for World’s Celebrities, 
INDEP., Oct. 13, 2008, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/london-
becomes-defamation-capital-for-worlds-celebrities-959288.html.   
 23. Polanski v. Condé Nast Publ’ns Ltd., [2005] UKHL 10, [1]–[4] (appeal taken 
from Eng.). 
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ison to that in the United States,24 the English court accepted juris-
diction over the case, and Polanski—despite his inability to personal-
ly appear in the English court to testify25—ultimately prevailed, 
winning £50,000 in damages.26  Similarly, in 2008, Rinant Akhme-
tov, one of Ukraine’s wealthiest businessmen, sued two Ukrainian 
news organizations in London for defamation, even though neither 
organization had a substantial readership in England; in fact, one of 
the organizations had less than 100 subscribers in England.27 
Libel tourism has infiltrated several other areas of discourse as 
well, including scientific and political speech.  For example, in 2007, 
U.S. manufacturer NMT Medical, Inc. sued English cardiologist Pe-
ter Wilmshurst in London, basing its defamation claim on criticisms 
of its research that Wilmshurst voiced while attending a U.S. confe-
rence; the criticisms were subsequently published in an online jour-
nal.28  Wilmshurst defended himself against multiple libel claims 
  
 24. In 2002, Vanity Fair had a 1.13 million-copy circulation in the United States 
and a 53,000-copy circulation in England and Wales.  Id. at [12]. 
 25. Polanski, a fugitive of the United States, was permitted to testify via video 
link from Paris because he would have faced extradition if he had set foot in Eng-
land.  Clare Dyer, Polanski Wins Right to Use Video Link in Libel Case, 
GUARDIAN, Feb. 11, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2005/feb/11/ 
film.law?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487.  Polanski has lived in France, where he is 
in no danger of being extradited to the United States, since pleading guilty in a 
California court to unlawful sexual intercourse with a thirteen-year-old girl.  Po-
lanski, [2005] UKHL at [38].   
 26. Mark Honigsbaum, Polanski Wins £50,000 Libel Damages, GUARDIAN, July 
23, 2005, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2005/jul/23/film.world. 
 27. See Akhmetov v. Serediba, [2008] All E.R. (D) 39 (Eng.); Hacks v Beaks, 
ECONOMIST, May 10, 2008, at 52; Libel Tourism: Writ Large, ECONOMIST, Jan. 
10, 2009, at 48.  Akhmetov received an undisclosed settlement from one of the 
organizations and a £50,000 settlement from the other.  Libel Tourism: Writ Large, 
supra note 27, at 48. 
 28. David Leigh, US Medical Firm Takes Trip to UK Courts to Sue Consultant, 
GUARDIAN, Nov. 10, 2009, at 12; Ian Sample, Setback for US Company Suing 
Cardiologist Peter Wilmshurst for Libel, GUARDIAN, Dec. 1, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2010/dec/01/company-suing-peter-wilmshurst-
libel.  Wilmshurst’s statements related to a study of the ability of a device “de-
signed to close a specific type of hole in the heart called a patent foramen ovale” 
to decrease migraines.  Sample, supra note 28. 
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brought by NMT Medical for nearly four years.29  Although the liti-
gation appeared to come to an end in April 2011, when NMT Medi-
cal entered liquidation, Wilmshurst had incurred well over £100,000 
in legal costs by that point.30  In the political context, Sheikh Rashid 
Ghannouchi, the leader of Tunisia’s An Nahda political party, won 
one of the largest libel-damages awards in the past decade—
£165,000—after the High Court of Justice found that the Dubai-
based television network Al Arabiya had defamed him by broadcast-
ing a report that Ghannouchi had links to al-Qaeda and was involved 
in the 2005 London bombings.31  Although the broadcast was in 
Arabic, the court exercised jurisdiction over the case because the 
broadcast was accessible in England via satellite.32 
Cases similar to Ghannouchi’s have given rise to a subset of libel 
tourism known as “libel terrorism,” a “politically loaded epithet . . . 
which refers to the use of defamation lawsuits by purported members 
of terrorist groups who attempt to stifle free speech concerning their 
activities by bringing defamation claims in jurisdictions” with plain-
tiff-friendly libel laws.33  The terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001 provided “the impetus for the growth of libel tourism in recent 
years,” as journalists and scholars began to investigate terrorism and 
the individuals who financially support it.34  After a number of for-
eign businessmen were identified as financiers of terrorist organiza-
tions, several of them filed, or threatened to file, defamation suits in 
England against U.S. authors and journalists.35   
Sheikh Khalid bin Mahfouz is the most infamous name asso-
ciated with libel terrorism (and libel tourism in general).  Before his 
  
 29. Hannah Devlin, US Company Suing Cardiologist for Libel Goes Into Liqui-
dation, TIMES (U.K.), Apr. 21, 2011, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/health/news/ 
article2993637.ece. 
 30. Id.; Libel-Law Reform: The Price of Truth, ECONOMIST, Mar. 19, 2011, at 
19.  
 31. Press Release, Carter-Ruck, Sheikh Rashid Ghannouchi—£165,000 Libel 
Award Follows False Al Qaeda Allegations (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.carter-
ruck.com/Miscellaneous?page=20. 
 32. The Report—APPENDIX: CASE STUDIES, LIBEL REFORM CAMPAIGN, 
http://www.libelreform.org/the-report?start=6 (last visited Apr. 27, 2011). 
 33. MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 2. 
 34. Feldman, supra note 1, at 2464. 
 35. Id. at 2464–65. 
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death in 2009, the Saudi billionaire had threatened to file at least 
thirty defamation suits in England against various authors and pub-
lishers.36  He was also responsible for the most prominent libel tour-
ism action ever filed—the one he brought against Dr. Rachel Ehren-
feld, the U.S. author of the 2003 book Funding Evil: How Terrorism 
Is Financed—and How to Stop It,37 who has since been referred to as 
the “poster child” of libel tourism.38  In Funding Evil, Ehrenfeld ex-
amined “the international web of financing supporting the activities 
of militant Islam throughout the world” and, citing numerous gov-
ernment documents, identified bin Mahfouz as a leading financier of 
terrorist organizations, such as al-Qaeda.39  In January 2004, she re-
ceived a letter from bin Mahfouz’s lawyers, denying that bin Mah-
fouz had “ever knowingly financed terrorism of any description” and 
threatening to sue her for defamation if she did not withdraw her 
book from circulation, destroy all unsold copies, publicly apologize 
to bin Mahfouz, donate money to a charity of his choice, and pay his 
legal fees.40  
After Ehrenfeld refused to comply with these demands, bin Mah-
fouz sued her for libel in the High Court in London.41  Despite the 
fact that Funding Evil was published and promoted in the United 
States, the High Court found that it had jurisdiction over the case 
because twenty-three copies of the book had been sold in the United 
Kingdom via online retailers and because the first chapter was ac-
  
 36. Id. at 2457–58; see also Bernstein, supra note 1, at 213 (noting that the 
“most feared overseas claimants” are Saudis who “place a high value on the de-
fence of their reputations”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. See generally RACHEL EHRENFELD, FUNDING EVIL: HOW TERRORISM IS 
FINANCED—AND HOW TO STOP IT (2003). 
 38. See Todd W. Moore, Note, Untying Our Hands: The Case for Uniform Per-
sonal Jurisdiction Over “Libel Tourists,” 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3207, 3207 
(2009); Abby Wisse Schachter, Praise for Leahy’s and Sessions’ First-Amendment 
Protecting “SPEECH Act,” N.Y. POST, June 23, 2010, http://www.nypost.com/ 
p/blogs/capitol/praise_for_leahy_and_sessions_first_0ZrkgNNBImcipY5hZ7tc2K. 
 39. McFarland, supra note 15, at 617; see Taylor, supra note 5, at 190. 
 40. RACHEL EHRENFELD, FUNDING EVIL, UPDATED: HOW TERRORISM IS 
FINANCED AND HOW TO STOP IT, at xi (expanded ed. 2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 41. McFarland, supra note 15, at 618; see Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld, [2005] 
EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.). 
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cessible in the United Kingdom via a website.42  Ehrenfeld chose not 
to appear in the action,43 and, as a result, the court entered a default 
judgment against her, ordering that she cease distribution of Funding 
Evil in the United Kingdom and pay bin Mahfouz £10,000 in dam-
ages as well as his legal costs.44  Ehrenfeld’s dilemma will be further 
discussed in Part D of this section, where the U.S. legislative reac-
tion to libel tourism will be discussed. 
B.  Why London? 
The common link between the libel tourism cases discussed in 
Part A is that the English courts exercised jurisdiction over and, in 
some cases, issued judgments against non-English residents despite 
their tenuous connections with England.  Collectively, these cases 
demonstrate the willingness of English courts to exercise jurisdiction 
“over defamation actions based on where the defamatory content is 
accessed rather than where it is produced, even when the access is 
relatively minimal.”45  Astoundingly, “one hit” on a website in Eng-
land may be “enough for a multimillion-pound libel action in Lon-
don.”46  Conversely, U.S. courts engage in a much narrower exercise 
of jurisdiction over foreign defendants.  English courts’ broad exer-
cise of jurisdiction, however, is not the only reason that libel tourists 
prefer England to the United States.  England is also an attractive 
forum because England’s substantive libel laws allow libel tourists 
to achieve favorable judgments that would likely be unattainable 
under U.S. libel laws.47 
  
 42. Bin Mahfouz, [2005] EWHC (QB) at [22]; see also Taylor, supra note 5, at 
193 n.16. 
 43. See Taylor, supra note 5, at 191 n.4 (“Ehrenfeld initially retained the law 
firm Morgan, Lewis & Bockius to represent her in the U.K. case, but she ultimate-
ly elected not to defend against Bin Mahfouz’s libel allegations.”). 
 44. Bin Mahfouz, [2005] EWHC (QB) at [73]–[75]. 
 45. Taylor, supra note 5, at 193 (emphasis in original). 
 46. Sarah Lyall, Britain, Long a Libel Mecca, Reviews Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
11, 2009, at Al (quoting Memorandum from Advance Publications, Inc., et al. to 
House of Commons Committee, U.K. Parliament (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmcumeds/memo/p
ress/ucps4502.htm).   
 47. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 38, at 3210. 
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1. Procedures 
Libel tourists prefer and are able to commence libel actions in 
England because of three chief aspects of English procedures that 
differ from U.S. procedures: (1) the application of the multiple pub-
lication rule; (2) the broad exercise of jurisdiction over foreign de-
fendants; and (3) the application of fee-shifting provisions. 
a. Statute of Limitations and “Publication” 
The statute of limitations on defamation claims runs for one year 
in England and one to three years in the United States, depending on 
the state.48  In both countries, the limitations period begins to run on 
the date that the defamatory statement on which the claim is based is 
published.49  But U.S. and English courts differ on what constitutes a 
“publication” for purposes of defamation actions.50  In the United 
States, most courts adhere to the single publication rule (“SPR”), 
under which a claimant can bring only one action for damages based 
on a single publication of a defamatory statement regardless of its 
level of distribution, unless the statement has been republished in a 
new format or edition.51  
  
 48. See Raymond W. Beauchamp, England’s Chilling Forecast: The Case for 
Granting Declaratory Relief to Prevent English Defamation Actions from Chilling 
American Speech, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3088 (2006); Kyu Ho Youm, Libel 
Law and the Press: U.S. and South Korea Compared, 13 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 
231, 236 (1995). 
 49. See Itai Maytal, Libel Lessons from Across the Pond: What British Courts 
Can Learn from the United States’ Chilling Experience with the “Multiple Publi-
cation Rule” in Traditional Media and the Internet, 3 J. INT’L MEDIA & ENT. L. 
121, 128, 134 (2010).   
 50. Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 18, at 260. 
 51. Maytal, supra note 49, at 128–29.  Under the Uniform Single Publication 
Act, a plaintiff can bring only one cause of action for defamation “founded upon 
any single publication . . . such as any one edition of a newspaper or book or mag-
azine” to recover damages for the reputational injury he suffered in all jurisdic-
tions in which publication occurred.  UNIF. SINGLE PUBL’N ACT § 1, 14 U.L.A. 
377 (1990); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577A Reporter’s Note 
(1977) (noting that most states now follow the SPR). 
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Conversely, English courts apply the multiple publication rule 
(“MPR”),52 under which a separate cause of action accrues every 
time that defamatory material is accessed—regardless of when it was 
first published.53  In other words, “every individual sale or distribu-
tion of defamatory material, such as a newspaper, magazine, or 
book, is treated as a distinct publication with a separate basis for lia-
bility and a separate statute of limitations.”54  England’s adherence 
to the MPR is significant to libel tourism because it provides the ba-
sis for English courts to apply English law in defamation actions 
lacking a substantial connection to England, as, under the MPR, 
every time the material is accessed in England, “a separate actiona-
ble tort against the plaintiff’s reputation [occurs] in” England.55 
Presently, the divergence between the MPR and SPR is most re-
levant in the context of defamation actions involving online publica-
tions.56  In this context, under the SPR, publication occurs when the 
material is first uploaded online, not every time that the material is 
accessed.57  Thus, the starting date of the limitations period is when 
the material is uploaded, “even if copies of the material continue to 
be made and be published years later.”58  While no U.S. court en-
countering this issue has found that the MPR should apply in the 
Internet context,59 English courts continue to apply the MPR in such 
  
 52. Maytal, supra note 49, at 124.  The MPR is also known as the Duke of 
Brunswick rule because it was first pronounced in the 1849 case, Duke of Bruns-
wick v. Harmer, [1849] 14 Q.B. 185, where the court held that the sale of a back 
copy of a seventeen-year-old Weekly Dispatch newspaper containing libelous 
statements constituted a separate publication.  The court found that the sale of the 
copy was actionable “despite the fact that the Duke had ordered his servant to 
obtain a copy of the relevant edition of the Weekly Dispatch from its publisher, 
Harmer,” reasoning that the back copy would “lower the reputation of the [Duke] 
in the mind of an agent.”  Bríd Jordan, The Modernization of English Libel Laws 
and Online Publication, 14 NO. 7 J. INTERNET L. 3, 5 (2011).   
 53. Maytal, supra note 49, at 126. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Taylor, supra note 5, at 197. 
 56. See Maytal, supra note 49, at 131–38 (discussing the divergent approaches). 
 57. Jordan, supra note 52, at 6. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Maytal, supra note 49, at 132.  In 2002, the New York Court of Appeals 
applied the SPR in a case involving an online publication and noted that the 
MPR’s application in this context would cause the “endless retriggering of the 
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cases.60  For example, in Loutchansky v. Times Newspapers Ltd.,61 
the English Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the SPR 
should apply, where a Russian businessman brought two libel ac-
tions against the Times exactly one year apart, with the first action 
based on news articles that the Times published in print, and the 
second based on the same articles after they had been made available 
in the Times’s online archive.62  The court found that the one-year 
statute of limitations did not bar the second libel action, emphasizing 
that the MPR is a “well established principle of English law” that 
would not inhibit publishers from maintaining online archives res-
ponsibly.63  Thus, under Loutchansky, the statute of limitations on 
defamation claims in England essentially lasts until the publication is 
no longer accessible in print or online—which may never occur.64 
b. Jurisdictional Determination 
After a libel plaintiff brings a defamation claim within the appli-
cable statute of limitations, the court must ensure that it has adequate 
jurisdictional grounds to compel a foreign defendant to appear in its 
jurisdiction and defend against the plaintiff’s claim.  In comparison 
with U.S. courts, the jurisdictional connections that English courts 
require of foreign defendants are rather tenuous.65  English courts 
may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign defendant: “(1) where the 
  
statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of defendants.”  Firth v. 
State, 775 N.E.2d 463, 466 (N.Y. 2002). 
 60. See Maytal, supra note 49, at 134–38. 
 61. [2002] E.M.L.R. 14, [2002] Q.B. 783, [2002] 1 All E.R. 652 (Eng.). 
 62. Id. at [73]–[76]. 
 63. Id. at [72], [74].  The Times subsequently filed an application before the 
European Court of Human Rights, arguing that the application of the MPR in the 
case breached its right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European 
Convention of Human Rights.  Times Newspapers Ltd. v. United Kingdom, [2009] 
E.M.L.R. 14.  The court dismissed the application, finding that the MPR did not 
violate Article 10 because the delay between Loutchansky’s two libel actions did 
not prevent the Times from arguing a reasonable defense.  Id. at [49]–[50]. 
 64. Andrew R. Klein, Some Thoughts on Libel Tourism, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 375, 
379–80 (2011). 
 65. Moore, supra note 38, at 3214; see also McFarland, supra note 15, at 644 
(noting that, unlike U.S. courts, English courts do not follow a constitutional view 
of personal jurisdiction). 
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defendant is present in England and served with process there; (2) 
where the defendant submits to the jurisdiction of the English court; 
or (3) where the plaintiff obtains judicial authorization to serve a 
summons outside the territorial borders of England.”66  Although a 
defendant who is served outside of England can challenge the judi-
cial authorization on grounds of forum non conveniens,67 English 
courts have broadly interpreted these principles, so that, in a defama-
tion action, “all the plaintiff must do to establish English jurisdiction 
is to prove that statements were published in England.”68  For exam-
ple, in Bin Mahfouz v. Ehrenfeld,69 the High Court found that the 
exercise of jurisdiction over Rachel Ehrenfeld was proper even 
though only twenty-three copies of her book had been purchased in 
the United Kingdom.70 
U.S. courts take a much narrower approach to the jurisdictional 
inquiry, focusing on whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign defendant complies with the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.71  To exercise personal jurisdiction over 
a foreign defendant, the defendant must have either: (1) a “substan-
tial, continuous, and systematic” presence in the forum; or (2) certain 
“minimum contacts” with the forum that relate to the litigation and 
  
 66. McFarland, supra note 15, at 643. 
 67. Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens: 
[T]he defendant . . . [can] contest the plaintiff’s choice of forum on 
grounds of substantial inconvenience, fairness and justice.  The doctrine 
allows a court having adjudicative jurisdiction to decline exercise of its 
jurisdiction whenever the particular circumstances of the case establish 
that it would be inappropriate or unjust to hear the case.   
Id. at 646.  English courts, however, have rarely applied the doctrine in defamation 
cases.  Id.; Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 18, at 264. 
 68. McFarland, supra note 15, at 644. 
 69. [2005] EWHC (QB) 1156 (Eng.). 
 70. Id. at [22]. 
 71. Moore, supra note 38, at 3222.  In determining whether the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper, a U.S. court first applies either “an 
applicable federal statute governing personal jurisdiction or, absent that, the long-
arm statute of the state in which the court resides.  A long-arm statute is a state 
statute that specifies under what conditions a court sitting in that particular state 
may hale a foreign party into its forum.”  Id. 
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make the assertion of jurisdiction reasonable.72   Non-resident defen-
dants’ minimum contacts are sufficient to justify a U.S. court’s exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction over them where they have either pur-
posefully availed themselves of the privilege of conducting activities 
within the forum or purposefully directed their conduct at the fo-
rum.
73
  For example, in Calder v. Jones,74 the U.S. Supreme Court 
found that the National Enquirer’s president and one of its reporters, 
both Florida residents, purposefully directed their magazine at Cali-
fornia because the magazine’s widest circulation was in California 
and the defendants were aware that the “brunt of the harm” of a de-
famatory statement would be felt there.75  As a result, they should 
have “reasonably anticipate[d] being haled into court there to answer 
for the truth of the statements” published.76  But the mere fact that 
defamatory material entered the forum, even if foreseeable, is an 
insufficient basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-
resident defendant.77     
c. Costs 
Finally, England is a procedurally attractive forum for libel tour-
ists because it is extremely expensive and inconvenient for many 
defendants to litigate there.  English libel actions are notoriously 
expensive; it is estimated that the attorneys’ fees required for just 
initiating a defense are approximately $200,000, with total costs eas-
  
 72. See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 1, at 2470 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).  Since 1945, the U.S. Supreme Court has “enun-
ciated several factors to be considered in determining whether the exercise of ju-
risdiction is reasonable,” including “the burden on the defendant, the forum State’s 
interest in adjudicating the dispute, the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient 
and effective relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most 
efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interest of the several States in 
furthering fundamental substantive social policies.”  Id. at 2470 n.83 (quoting 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985)).  The burden rests on 
the defendant to prove that the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over him or her 
would be unreasonable.  Moore, supra note 38, at 3224. 
 73. Feldman, supra note 1, at 2471. 
 74. 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
 75. Id. at 785–86, 789. 
 76. Id. at 790 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 77. McFarland, supra note 15, at 640. 
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ily exceeding $1,000,0000.78  Libel trials can also last for years and 
attract unwanted media attention.79  For example, after English histo-
rian David Irving sued Emory University Professor Deborah Lipstadt 
in England for defamation in 1996,80 Lipstadt and her publisher 
spent over £2,000,000 over the course of four years before they fi-
nally prevailed at trial.81  English fee-shifting rules also incentivize 
libel tourists to file their actions in England, as the rules require that 
the losing party pay the winning party’s legal costs.82  Additionally, 
many barristers agree to represent libel claimants on a “no win, no 
fee” arrangement, thereby insulating claimants from financial liabili-
ty should they not prevail.83 
2. Substantive Laws 
The core divergence between U.S. and English libel laws is that 
English law presumes that a defamatory statement is false while U.S. 
law presumes that a defamatory statement is true.84  As a result, in 
  
 78. Bernstein, supra note 1, at 221; Taylor, supra note 5, at 200 n.66 (citing 
David Kohler, Forty Years After New York Times v. Sullivan: the Good, the Bad, 
and the Ugly, 83 OR. L. REV. 1203, 1205–06 (2004)). 
 79. McFarland, supra note 15, at 649. 
 80. Irving alleged that Lipstadt and her publisher, Penguin Books Limited, de-
famed him by publishing statements in her book that alleged he was a “Nazi apol-
ogist and an admirer of Hitler, who has resorted to the distortion of facts and to the 
manipulation of documents in support of his contention that the Holocaust did not 
take place.”  Irving v. Penguin Books Ltd., [2000] EWHC (QB) 115, [1.2] (Eng.); 
see also DEBORAH LIPSTADT, DENYING THE HOLOCAUST: THE GROWING ASSAULT 
ON TRUTH AND MEMORY (1994). 
 81. See Steve Busfield, Irving Loses Holocaust Libel Case, GUARDIAN, Apr. 11, 
2000, http://www.guardian.co.uk/books/2000/apr/11/irving.uk. 
 82. See id. (noting that Irving would likely be liable for the defendants’ legal 
costs); McFarland, supra note 15, at 626 & n.42; Staveley-O’Carroll, supra note 
18, at 259; Taylor, supra note 5, at 200.  Conversely, in most U.S. proceedings, 
each party pays his own attorney.  Rendleman, supra note 2, at 478–79.  
 83. McFarland, supra note 15, at 627. 
 84. See MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 50–51.  Specifically, a defamatory state-
ment is presumed false in England once the plaintiff demonstrates that he or she 
was identified in the writing at issue and that the writing was published.  
Bernstein, supra note 1, at 219–20.  Conversely, in the United States, the plaintiff 
generally has the burden to prove: 
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England, once a plaintiff shows that a defamatory statement was 
published about him or her, the burden is placed on the author or 
publisher to prove the truth of the statement in order to escape lia-
bility.85  Proving truth, however, is not an easy task, as a defendant is 
required to “prove the substantial truth of every material fact.”86  
Additionally, attempting to prove the truth of a statement is danger-
ous because if the defendant tries but fails to do so, he or she could 
face an aggravated-damages judgment.87   
Conversely, in the United States, the plaintiff most prove that the 
defamatory statement is false,88 and, if the plaintiff is a public offi-
cial or public figure, that the defendant acted with actual malice—
that is, with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless 
disregard as to whether the statement was false or not.89  Actual ma-
  
(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) an unprivi-
leged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting to at least negli-
gence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the 
statement irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm 
caused by the publication. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977). 
 85. MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 50–51.  
 86. Beauchamp, supra note 48, at 3078. 
 87. Staveley-O’Caroll, supra note 18, at 257. 
 88. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775–76 (1986); 
see also MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 50–51. 
 89. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80, 285–86 (1964) 
(announcing the actual malice standard and that it applies in defamation actions 
brought by public officials); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 162–63 
(1967) (holding that the actual malice standard applies in defamation actions 
brought by public figures).  The Supreme Court did not define “public official” in 
Sullivan but stated in Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966) that “the ‘public 
official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of gov-
ernment employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial respon-
sibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”  In Butts, the 
Court defined “public figures” as those who are “intimately involved in the resolu-
tion of important public questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in 
areas of concern to society at large.”  388 U.S. at 164. 
The actual malice standard has not been extended to apply in defamation ac-
tions brought by private individuals because they lack “the same degree of access 
to the media to rebut defamatory comments” as public officials and public figures, 
who voluntarily expose themselves to public scrutiny.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 363 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  But private individuals 
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lice must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, which is a 
difficult undertaking.90  Litigation involving the standard nearly al-
ways concerns whether the publisher acted with reckless disregard,91 
which, generally, can be proven only where there is “sufficient evi-
dence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained 
serious doubts as to the truth of his publication.”92  Courts have not 
precisely defined how much evidence is sufficient,93 and where the 
standard is strictly applied, claimants “have little chance of prevail-
ing without evidence that the publisher actually knew the statements 
were false,” evidence that is rarely available in any defamation 
case.94  As a result, in the United States, defendants who publish 
statements concerning matters of public concern or regarding public 
figures, while not impervious to defamation liability, are strongly 
safeguarded against it.95 
Defendants are not nearly so insulated from liability in English 
defamation actions, as the burden rests on defendants to prove the 
truth of the statement at issue, regardless of the plaintiff’s status as a 
public or private figure.96  But, in the past decade, the English courts 
have taken some steps to protect media defendants, most notably 
through the Reynolds defense, which may apply where the defendant 
published an article containing a defamatory statement but engaged 
in responsible and fair journalistic methods, had justification for in-
cluding the statement, and the article as a whole concerned a matter 
of public interest.97   
  
who are so involved in a matter of public interest that they are public figures for 
the purposes of that sole matter must prove actual malice.  Id. at 345.   
 90. See, e.g., MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 20. 
 91. Id. at 20. 
 92. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968).   
 93. See Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 752–53 (Mass. 2007). 
 94. MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 24 (discussing St. Amant). 
 95. David F. Partlett, The Libel Tourist and the Ugly American: Free Speech in 
an Era of Modern Global Communications, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 629, 643 
(2009).  But see MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 31–37 (discussing the tension be-
tween the traditional actual malice standard as announced in Sullivan and the more 
relaxed, objective approach announced in Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Con-
naughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989)). 
 96. MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 44–45. 
 97. See Jameel v. Wall Street Journal (Europe), [2006] 3 W.L.R. 642 (Eng.).  
The Reynolds defense was first announced in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd., 
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C.  The International Chilling Effect 
With the expansion of libel tourism, publishers based in the 
United States and other countries have begun rejecting or withhold-
ing publication of certain works in fear that libel lawsuits will be 
filed against them in England, where more speech-restrictive laws 
apply.98  For example, according to Rachel Ehrenfeld, after the Eng-
lish court entered a default defamation judgment against her, the 
judgment tarnished her reputation in the United States, as two pub-
lishers that had previously published her work rejected a well-
researched but potentially controversial article that she submitted for 
consideration.99  Similarly, in 2004, Random House, Inc. chose to 
withhold publication of the book House of Bush, House of Saud: The 
Secret Relationship Between the World’s Two Most Powerful Dynas-
ties in the United Kingdom lest that members of the Saudi royal fam-
ily would sue for defamation.100  And, in 2007, Cambridge Universi-
ty Press chose to withhold publication of the book Alms for Jihad 
after a threatened libel action; its decision “was not based on a ‘lack 
of confidence’ in the book, but rather solely on a ‘fear of incurring 
costly legal expenses and getting involved in a lengthy trial.’”101 
Authors self-censoring their work to comply with restrictive libel 
laws is another byproduct of libel tourism’s chilling effect.  For ex-
ample, in a March 2011 editorial printed in the Guardian, English 
science writer Simon Singh, who was personally sued in England for 
  
[1998] 3 W.L.R. 862 (Eng.).  While the Reynolds defense provides some protec-
tion for journalists, it is still not as protective of free speech as U.S. defamation 
laws.  See Kyu Ho Youm, Liberalizing British Defamation Law: A Case of Import-
ing the First Amendment?, 13 COMM. L. & POL’Y 415, 445 (2008). 
 98. See Bernstein, supra note 1, at 222; Taylor, supra note 5, at 202–03; Patrick 
Wintour, ‘Laughing Stock’ Libel Laws to Go, Says Clegg, GUARDIAN, Jan. 7, 
2011, at 12. 
 99. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2006 WL 1096816, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006). 
100. Patrick Barrett, ‘Libel Tourism’ Scotches Bush Book, GUARDIAN, Mar. 24, 
2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2004/mar/24/pressandpublishing.politics 
andthemedia; see also CRAIG UNGER, HOUSE OF BUSH, HOUSE OF SAUD: THE 
SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WORLD’S TWO MOST POWERFUL 
DYNASTIES (2004). 
101. Taylor, supra note 5, at 201; see also Partlett, supra note 95, at 652. 
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libel by the British Chiropractic Association,102 discussed self-
censorship in the scientific community due to libel tourism.103  Spe-
cifically, Singh discussed an email exchange that he had with a U.S. 
researcher, who had submitted a paper for publication consideration 
to an English journal and a U.S. journal, both of which have interna-
tional circulations.104  The English journal rejected the paper on the 
basis that it could have legal implications under English libel 
laws.105  And while the U.S. journal made a publication offer, it later 
demanded edits to be made in order to avoid the “serious risk of be-
ing sued in London according to English libel law.”106 
While both the withholding of publications and self-censorship 
are negative effects of libel tourism, perhaps the greatest danger of 
libel tourism is that authors will begin to avoid writing about contro-
versial, but important, subject matters altogether. 
D.  The U.S. Reaction 
After Saudi billionaire Sheikh Khalid bin Mahfouz won a default 
defamation judgment in London against U.S. author Rachel Ehren-
feld, Ehrenfeld sought her own relief in a U.S. court, a choice that 
publicized the issue of libel tourism and led to a national outcry 
against it.  To be clear, Ehrenfeld did not appear in London to defend 
herself in the English court; rather, as she puts it herself: 
I did not lose because there was a trial and I couldn’t prove 
my case.  I lost by default.  I refused to acknowledge the 
British jurisdiction over me because I’m not a British citizen.  
  
102. See Simon Rogers, How Many Libel Cases Are There?, GUARDIAN, Apr. 15, 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/apr/15/libel-cases-general-
election. 
103. Simon Singh, English Libel Law Is a Vulture Circling the World, GUARDIAN, 
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I don’t live there.  I didn’t see any reason why I should go to 
court there or pay huge financial expenses.107 
Bin Mahfouz never attempted to enforce his judgment against 
Ehrenfeld, seemingly satisfied with publicizing the judgment on the 
Internet.108  Nevertheless, Ehrenfeld sought a declaration in the 
Southern District of New York that the judgment was unenforceable 
in the United States.109  A U.S. court, however, cannot order a decla-
ratory judgment110 unless it first determines that it may exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant.111  Finding that bin 
Mahfouz lacked sufficient minimum contacts with New York, the 
court dismissed the action on the basis that the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over him would be improper.112  Ehrenfeld appealed the 
decision to the Second Circuit, which upheld the dismissal.113 
But Ehrenfeld did not stop there.  Dissatisfied with the Second 
Circuit’s decision and having spent “many sleepless nights worried 
that Mahfouz [would] try to enforce the English judgment against 
  
107. Melissa Parker, Dr. Rachel Ehrenfeld Interview: Terrorism Funding Expert 
on SPEECH Act and 9/11, SMASHING INTERVIEWS MAG. (Sept. 8, 2010), 
http://smashinginterviews.com/interviews/newsmakers/dr-rachel-ehrenfeld-
interview-terrorism-funding-expert-on-speech-act-and-911 (quoting Ehrenfeld). 
108. MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 4. 
109. Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, No. 04 Civ. 9641(RCC), 2006 WL 1096816, at 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2006).   
110. By issuing a declaratory judgment, a U.S. court “[declares] the rights and 
other legal relations of any interested party.”  Moore, supra note 38, at 3221 (cit-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006)).  Declaratory judgments “have the force and ef-
fect of a final judgment or decree . . . .”  Id.  
111. McFarland, supra note 15, at 658.  In the context of libel tourism, “[t]his 
presents a substantial problem . . . because the prospective defendant is a foreign 
citizen pursuing a foreign judgment in a foreign court.”  Id.; see also Moore, supra 
note 38, at 3221. 
112. Ehrenfeld, 2006 WL 1096816, at *6. 
113. Ehrenfeld v. Mahfouz, 518 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 2008).  Initially, the 
Second Circuit found that the case presented a novel question of New York law 
regarding the scope of New York’s long-arm statute and certified the question to 
New York’s highest state court, the New York Court of Appeals.  Ehrenfeld v. 
Mahfouz, 489 F.3d 542, 548, 550 (2d Cir. 2007).  The Court of Appeals deter-
mined that New York did not have personal jurisdiction over bin Mahfouz because 
he had not transacted business in New York within the meaning of the long-arm 
statute.  Ehrenfeld v. Bin Mahfouz, 881 N.E.2d 830, 838 (N.Y. 2007). 
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[her] in New York,”114 Ehrenfeld began a campaign for legislative 
action to be taken to prevent libel tourists from enforcing their for-
eign judgments in U.S. courts against U.S. citizens.115  And her ef-
forts succeeded: In March 2008, the New York Senate and Assembly 
unanimously passed the Libel Terrorism Protection Act 
(“LTPA”).116  Otherwise known as “Rachel’s Law,” the LTPA was 
the model on which the federal SPEECH Act was based.117 
Before discussing the SPEECH Act, a brief discussion of the en-
forcement of foreign judgments by U.S. courts is in order.  General-
ly, the enforcement of foreign judgments is governed by the prin-
ciple of international comity,118 which the U.S. Supreme Court first 
announced in the 1895 decision Hilton v. Guyot.119  Comity stands 
for the policy that U.S. courts will “extend recognition . . . to judg-
ments of courts from other nations except in situations where the 
foreign law or judgment is contrary to American public policy” or 
the foreign court lacked jurisdiction.120  Non-recognition of foreign 
  
114. Libel Tourism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and Admin. 
Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 12 (2009). 
115. See MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 4. 
116. Id. at 4, 245.  The LTPA took two steps to protect U.S. authors like Ehren-
feld from libel tourists who may seek to enforce their foreign judgments in New 
York.  First, it amended New York’s statute regarding the enforcement of foreign 
money judgments to permit New York courts to reject foreign judgments where 
the foreign court applied a standard less protective of free speech than a New York 
court would have applied.  N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(8) (MCKINNEY 2008).  
Second, it amended New York’s long-arm statute to permit New York courts to 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant to the full extent allowed 
by the U.S. Constitution.  Id. § 302(d). 
117. MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 4, 245–46. 
118. Warshaw, supra note 1, at 289; Rendleman, supra note 2, at 473. 
119. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
120. MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 180; see McFarland, supra note 15, at 654.  In 
Hilton, the Supreme Court announced the following rule of comity: 
When an action is brought in a court of this country, by a citizen of a 
foreign country against one of our own citizens, to recover a sum of mon-
ey adjudged by a court of that country to be due from the defendant to the 
plaintiff, and the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a 
competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and 
upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend against them, 
and its proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurispru-
dence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment is prima 
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judgments is rare,121 even in cases where there are differences in the 
substantive laws applied.122  In the defamation context, in only two 
cases have U.S. courts refused to enforce foreign judgments on the 
basis that they were contrary to First Amendment principles.123 
Despite U.S. courts’ ability to refuse the recognition or enforce-
ment of foreign defamation judgments pursuant to the longstanding 
public-policy and jurisdiction exceptions to international comity, 
federal legislators in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate 
quickly responded to New York’s enactment of the LTPA with com-
peting federal legislation,124 a compromise of which was signed into 
  
facie evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter adjudged; and it should 
be held conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court, unless some 
special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment, as by showing that 
it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that by the principles of interna-
tional law, and by the comity of our own country, it should not be given 
full credit and effect. 
159 U.S. at 205–06 (emphasis added). 
Nearly two-thirds of the states have adopted the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act or the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments 
Recognition Act, “which permit state courts to refuse to enforce foreign judgments 
that violate the public policy of the individual state or the United States as a 
whole.”  Taylor, supra note 5, at 199; see also Moore, supra note 38, at 3220.   
121. Rendleman, supra note 2, at 473. 
122. See McFarland, supra note 15, at 654 (noting that the public policy exception 
has been strictly construed and that “U.S. courts have . . . tolerated difference in 
substantive law and extended respect to the foreign judgment”). 
123. Taylor, supra note 5, at 199; see Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 
249–50 (Md. 1997) (denying recognition of the plaintiff’s judgment because 
“principles governing defamation actions under English law . . . are . . . contrary to 
Maryland defamation law”); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., 585 
N.Y.S.2d 661, 664–65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (refusing to enforce an English defa-
mation judgment because doing so would violate the public policy of New York).   
124. Taylor, supra note 5, at 206.  See Securing the Protection of Our Enduring 
and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, H.R. 2765, 111th Cong. (2009); Free 
Speech Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 1304, 111th Cong. (2009); Free Speech Pro-
tection Act of 2009, S. 449, 111th Cong. (2009).  Soon after New York enacted 
the LTPA, but prior to the enactment of the SPEECH Act, Illinois, Florida, and 
California enacted legislation nearly identical to the LTPA’s discretionary prohibi-
tion against the enforcement of foreign defamation judgments.  See CAL. CIV. 
PROC. CODE §§ 1716-17 (West Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 55.605(2)(h) 
(West Supp. 2011); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-209(b-5), 5/12-621(b)(7) 
(West Supp. 2010). 
File: Sanchez - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V2 Created on:  5/31/2011 12:24:00 AM Last Printed: 5/31/2011 12:24:00 AM 
492    UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 3   
law on August 10, 2010 in the form of the SPEECH Act.125  The 
SPEECH Act is quite similar to the LTPA, but it does not simply 
authorize U.S. courts to refuse recognition or enforcement of foreign 
defamation judgments that are contrary to First Amendment prin-
ciples; rather it mandates it: Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A) 
states that a U.S. court 
shall not recognize or enforce a foreign judgment for defama-
tion unless . . . [it] determines that . . . the defamation law 
applied in the foreign court’s adjudication provided at least 
as much protection for freedom of speech and press in that 
case as would be provided by the first amendment to the 
Constitution of the United States and by the constitution and 
law of the State in which the domestic court is located.126 
U.S. courts must also not recognize or enforce foreign defama-
tion judgments where the foreign court’s exercise of personal juris-
diction was inconsistent with U.S. due process requirements.127  Sa-
liently, § 4105 provides that the party opposing the enforcement of 
the judgment is entitled to attorneys’ fees if such party prevails.128 
The SPEECH Act does require U.S. courts to recognize or en-
force a foreign defamation judgment, even where the foreign court 
applied substantive law that did not comport with First Amendment 
principles, if the judgment creditor (the libel tourist) is able to dem-
onstrate that “the party opposing recognition or enforcement of the 
foreign judgment” (the U.S. author or publisher) “would have been 
found liable for defamation” by a U.S. court.129  In other words, if 
the libel tourist can prove that he or she would have prevailed in the 
foreign adjudication had U.S. law been applied, a U.S. court will 
enforce or recognize the foreign judgment.  The actual effect of this 
provision is questionable, however, as it “effectively forces a new 
trial in the American venue,” requiring the libel tourist to prove his 
  
125. Taylor, supra note 5, at 205; Press Release, supra note 12. 
126. 28 U.S.C. § 4102(a)(1)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.). 
127. Id. § 4102(b)(1). 
128. Id. § 4105.  Section 4104(a)(1) also permits a U.S. person against whom a 
foreign defamation judgment has been entered to seek a declaratory judgment that 
the foreign judgment is “repugnant” to U.S. law.  
129. Id. § 4102(a)(1)(B). 
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case under U.S. law, “with the added zinger that if . . . [he or she] 
loses, [he or she] will be liable for attorney’s fees under [§] 4105.”130 
The SPEECH Act has been equally lauded and derided.  While 
some have celebrated its enactment as essential to the protection of 
free-speech rights,131 others have criticized its “broad-brush rejection 
of all foreign judgments” as being “too blunt and too broad” and 
possibly damaging to the United States’ foreign relations.132  In the 
context of libel tourism, while the Act may provide extra certainty to 
U.S. authors and publishers that they will not be forced to comply 
with foreign judgments unless a U.S. court determines otherwise, it 
does (and can do) nothing to prevent U.S. authors and publishers 
from being sued for defamation in foreign courts in the first place. 
III. THE DRAFT DEFAMATION ACT 2011 
At the same time that the SPEECH Act was being drafted in the 
United States, English policymakers were debating changes to their 
own libel laws.133  In July 2008, the U.N. Human Rights Committee 
issued a report, finding that English libel laws have “served to dis-
courage critical media reporting on matters of serious public interest, 
adversely affecting the ability of scholars and journalists to publish 
their work, including through the phenomenon known as libel tour-
ism.”134  Five months later, three influential Members of Parliament 
from each major political party urged the government to reform Eng-
land’s libel laws, including “the ‘international scandal’ of libel tour-
  
130. MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 255–56. 
131. See Kristen Rasmussen, SPEECH Act Protects Against Libel Tourism, 34 
NEWS MEDIA & L. 20 (2010); Editorial, No More ‘Libel Tourists’: Congress Steps 
In to Protect Writers; Now Britain Must Do Its Part, WASH. POST, Aug. 13, 2010, 
available at 2010 WLNR 16160988; Editorial, A Victory for Writing, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 23, 2010, at A22. 
132. Klein, supra note 64, at 387 (quoting Rendleman, supra note 2, at 487) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted). 
133. Id. at 385; see also MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 262. 
134. Duncan Campbell, British Libel Laws Violate Human Rights, Says UN, 
GUARDIAN, Aug. 14, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/aug/14/ 
law.unitednations; LIBEL REFORM CAMPAIGN, FREE SPEECH IS NOT FOR SALE 
(2009), http://www.libelreform.org/the-report?showall=1 (hereinafter FREE 
SPEECH REPORT]. 
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ism.”135  Subsequently, Justice Minister Bridget Prentice promised 
that the libel laws’ efficacy would be formally examined, marking 
the first time since 1843 that the government promised an expansive 
reform of England’s libel laws.136   
In November 2009, English Pen and Index on Censorship pub-
lished the results of a year-long inquiry into England’s libel laws in a 
report titled Free Speech Is Not For Sale.137  The report found that 
“lawyers, publishers, journalists, bloggers and [non-governmental 
organizations]” were concerned that the laws were stifling freedom 
of expression both in the United Kingdom and internationally and 
offered ten reformation recommendations.138  Taking the initiative to 
formulate specific reforms, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, a long-time 
defender of free expression and campaigner for human rights,139 
  
135. David Pallister, MPs Demand Reform of Libel Laws, GUARDIAN, Dec. 18, 
2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/dec/18/mps-demand-reform-of-
libel-laws.  Michael Gove, a member of the Conservative Party, Norman Lamb, a 
member of the Liberal Democrat party, and Dennis MacShane, a member of the 
Labour Party, led the initiative.  Id.  According to Lord Lester, “[n]ever before . . . 
have the three main political parties been committed to using Parliament to reform 
law.”  Lord Lester: ‘The Law is the Enemy of Free Speech,’ INDEP., Aug. 26, 
2010, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/press/lord-lester-the-law-is-the-
enemy-of-free-speech-2062103.html [hereinafter Lord Lester]. 
136. Libel Reform Campaign Welcomes Government’s Draft Defamation Bill, 
LIBEL REFORM CAMPAIGN (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.libelreform.org/news/490-
libel-reform-campaign-welcomes-governments-draft-defamation-bill [hereinafter 
LRC Welcomes Draft Bill].  It should be noted that some modifications to English 
libel laws were made in the 1952 and 1996 Defamation Acts.  Id. 
137. See FREE SPEECH REPORT, supra note 134.  English Pen, founded in 1921, is 
an association devoted to promoting literature and supporting writers.  About Eng-
lish Pen, ENGLISH PEN, http://www.englishpen.org/aboutenglishpen (last visited 
Apr. 29, 2011).  Index on Censorship, founded in 1972, is England’s leading or-
ganization promoting freedom of expression.  About Index on Censorship, INDEX 
ON CENSORSHIP, http://www.indexoncensorship.org/about-index-on-censorship 
(last visited Apr. 29, 2011). 
138. FREE SPEECH REPORT, supra note 134. 
139. Lord Lester, a member of the House of Lords, “was a prime mover behind 
the Human Rights Act, the Equality Act, the Civil Partnership Act, and the Forced 
Marriage (Civil Protection) Act, which were preceded by Bills which he intro-
duced in Parliament.”  Lord Lester, supra note 135; see also Lord Lester of Herne 
Hill, U.K. PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/biographies/anthony-
lester/26915 (last visited Apr. 29, 2011). 
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published a draft defamation bill in May 2010,140 containing twenty-
two clauses, including one directly aimed at libel tourism.141  And, in 
July 2010, one month before President Obama signed the SPEECH 
Act into law, the Ministry of Justice committed to developing op-
tions for libel reform via draft legislation by March 2011.142 
The Ministry of Justice delivered on its promise and, on March 
15, 2011, introduced a draft bill, entitled the Draft Defamation Act 
2011, for public consultation and pre-legislative review.143  The 
Draft Act aims to ensure that an appropriate balance is struck be-
tween freedom of speech and the protection of reputation as well as 
to “ensure that the threat of libel proceedings is not used to frustrate 
robust scientific and academic debate, or to impede responsible in-
vestigative journalism and the valuable work undertaken by non-
governmental organisations.”144  It contains ten clauses,145 four of 
  
140. What Does Lord Lester’s Defamation Bill Propose?, GUARDIAN, May 27, 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/may/27/lord-lester-defamation-bill-
analysis. 
141. For a copy of Lord Lester’s Draft Defamation Bill, see Lord Lester’s Private 
Members’ Defamation Bill, GUARDIAN, May 27, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2010/may/27/lord-lester-defamation-bill.  Subsec-
tion (2) of the thirteenth clause addressed defamatory publications published out-
side the jurisdiction and stated: “No harmful event is to be regarded as having 
occurred in relation to the claimant unless the publication in the jurisdiction can 
reasonably be regarded as having caused substantial harm to the claimant’s reputa-
tion having regard to the extent of publication elsewhere.”  Id. 
142. Jordan, supra note 52, at 4–5. 
143. See CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, at 3. 
144. Id. 
145. Substantively, the Draft Act provides four defenses for defamation defen-
dants.  First, it essentially codifies the Reynolds defense by providing a defense for 
defendants who show that they acted responsibly in publishing a statement con-
cerning a matter of public interest.  Id. annex a, at 1 (clause 2).  Second, it replaces 
the defense of justification with a defense of truth for defendants who show that a 
statement that “conveys two or more distinct imputations” is substantially true.  Id. 
annex a, at 2 (clause 3(1)–(2)).  Third, it clarifies the current defense of fair com-
ment by creating the defense of honest opinion, applicable where a defendant 
proves that the statement at issue was an opinion on a matter of public interest that 
“an honest person could have held.”  Id. annex a, at 2–3 (clause 4).  Finally, it 
extends the protections of absolute and qualified privilege, including providing 
absolute privilege to fair and accurate reports of proceedings in any court outside 
the United Kingdom and qualified privilege to fair and accurate reports of pro-
ceedings at a scientific or academic conference.  Id. annex a, at 3–4 (clause 5). 
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which concern procedural reforms that are relevant to libel tourism: 
(1) the adoption of an SPR; (2) the requirement that courts refuse to 
exercise jurisdiction in libel actions brought against non-resident 
defendants unless England is clearly the most appropriate forum; (3) 
the requirement that claimants prove that the publication of defama-
tory statements caused substantial harm to their reputations; and (4) 
the presumption that a defamation trial will not be tried by a jury.146 
A.  Adoption of the Single Publication Rule 
The Draft Defamation Act’s sixth clause introduces an SPR, 
which would require libel claimants to bring a defamation claim 
against a publisher within one year from the date of the defamatory 
material’s first publication—even if the publisher subsequently pub-
lished the same, or substantially the same, material.147  Under the 
currently applicable MPR, publishers are potentially liable for a sep-
arate cause of action every time that defamatory material, which they 
published, is accessed—regardless of whether the claimant had al-
ready brought a defamation action regarding the material.148 
The SPR would not apply, however, where the manner of the 
subsequent publication was “materially different” from the manner 
of the first publication.149  To determine whether the manner of pub-
lication is “materially different,” the clause provides that courts may 
consider “the level of prominence that a statement is given” and “the 
extent of the subsequent publication.”150  The Draft Act’s explanato-
ry notes offer an instructive example:  
[W]here a story has first appeared relatively obscurely in a 
section of a website where several clicks need to be gone 
through to access it, but has subsequently been promoted to a 
position where it can be directly accessed from the home 
  
146. See id. annex a, at 1, 4–6 (clauses, 1, 6–8). 
147. Id. annex a, at 4 (clause 6(1)). 
148. See supra Section II.B.1.a. 
149. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex a, at 5 (clause 
6(4)). 
150. Id. annex a, at 5 (clause 6(5)). 
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page of the site, thereby increasing considerably the number 
of hits it receives.151 
Notwithstanding the adoption of an SPR, the clause makes clear 
that courts would still have discretion under section 32A of the Limi-
tation Act 1980 to allow defamation actions to proceed outside the 
one-year limitations period where it is equitable to do so.152 
B.  Jurisdiction 
The Draft Act’s seventh clause addresses the jurisdictional issue 
directly related to libel tourism: when libel actions are brought 
against defendants not domiciled in the United Kingdom or a Mem-
ber State.153  Presently, English courts have broad discretion to de-
cline jurisdiction over such defendants under the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens,154 but this doctrine is rarely applied.155  This clause 
makes forum non conveniens superfluous in that it mandates that a 
court shall not exercise jurisdiction in defamation actions brought 
against non-resident defendants unless it is “satisfied that, of all the 
places in which the statement complained of has been published, 
England . . . is clearly the most appropriate place in which to bring 
an action in respect of the statement.”156  While the clause does not 
delineate factors that courts should consider in assessing whether 
England is the most appropriate forum, the explanatory notes offer 
some guidance via the following example: “[I]f a statement was pub-
lished 100,000 times in Australia and only 5,000 times in England, 
that would be a good basis on which to conclude that the most ap-
propriate jurisdiction in which to bring an action in respect of the 
statement was Australia rather than England.”157   
  
151. Id. annex b, at 82 (Explanatory Note paragraph 44). 
152. Id. annex a, at 5 (clause 6(6)). 
153. Id. annex a, at 5–6 (clause 7).  The clause also applies to libel actions brought 
against persons who are not domiciled “in a state which is for the time being a 
contracting party to the Lugano Convention.”  Id. annex a, at 5 (clause 7(1)(c)). 
154. Id. at 34 (paragraph 82). 
155. See supra Section II.B.1. 
156. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex a, at 5 (clause 
7(2)). 
157. Id. annex b, at 83 (Explanatory Note paragraph 47).  This clause is intended 
to comport with the existing procedural framework for libel claims.  Id. annex b, at 
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C.  Requirement of Substantial Harm 
The Draft Act’s first clause would impose a new requirement on 
libel claimants to demonstrate that a defamatory statement caused 
them “substantial harm.”158  Unlike U.S. proceedings, libel is cur-
rently actionable in England without proof of damages, that is, once 
claimants prove that they were identified in a defamatory statement, 
the court presumes that they suffered damages as a result of the 
statement’s publication.159  This clause would remove that presump-
tion; it provides: “A statement is not defamatory unless its publica-
tion has caused or is likely to cause substantial harm to the reputa-
tion of the claimant.”160  
D.  Presumption of Trial Without Jury 
Currently, juries preside over defamation trials upon application 
by either party “unless the court considers that the trial requires any 
prolonged examination . . . which cannot conveniently be made with 
a jury.”161  The Draft Act’s eighth clause would establish the pre-
sumption that a judge, rather than a jury, will decide a defamation 
  
83 (Explanatory Note paragraph 48).  For example, under Civil Procedure Rule 
(“CPR”) 6.36, a claimant must receive permission from the court before serving a 
claim form on a non-resident defendant outside of the United Kingdom.  Civil 
Procedure Rule 6.36, U.K. Ministry of Justice, available at Service of Documents, 
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov.uk/civil/procrules_fin/contents/ 
parts/part06.htm#IDAXA3EC (last visited Apr. 29, 2011).  Thus, if the Draft De-
famation Act’s jurisdictional clause is enacted, and a libel claimant applied under 
CPR 6.36 to serve a claim form outside of the United Kingdom, “the court would 
refuse to exercise its discretion to grant permission if it thought that it would not 
have jurisdiction to hear the claim as a result of this clause.”  CONSULTATION 
PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex b, at 83 (Explanatory Note paragraph 
48).   
158. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex a, at 1 (clause 
1). 
159. Id. at 8 (“The Proposals” paragraph 1); see supra Section II.B.2. 
160. Id. annex a, at 1 (clause 1).  If enacted, the clause would essentially codify 
the holding of Jameel v. Dow Jones & Co., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 75 (Eng.), where 
it was held that libel claimants must establish “a real and substantial wrong.”  Id. 
at [50]; CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, at 8 (“The Propos-
als” paragraph 7). 
161. Id. annex b, at 83–84 (Explanatory Note paragraph 50). 
File: Sanchez - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V2 Created on: 5/31/2011 12:24:00 AM Last Printed: 5/31/2011 12:24:00 AM 
2011 LONDON, LIBEL CAPITAL NO LONGER? 499 
trial.162  The clause is motivated by the goal of making defamation 
trials more efficient, as judges could resolve preliminary issues—
such as whether claimants have suffered substantial harm to their 
reputations—at an early stage rather than at trial.163  Ideally, this ef-
ficiency would lead to early dismissals and settlements, which would 
significantly reduce the costs of libel litigation.164 
IV. ANALYSIS 
This section will evaluate the effect of the Draft Defamation Act 
on libel tourism actions brought in England as well as the potential 
enforcement of those actions in the United States.  Part A analyzes 
the efficacy of the Draft Act in relation to its goal of curbing libel 
tourism.  Part B considers the advantages of incorporating a choice-
of-law provision into the Draft Act.  Finally, Part C discusses the 
interplay between the Draft Defamation Act and the SPEECH Act, 
considering whether U.S. courts will enforce future English defama-
tion judgments that will be rendered in accordance with the enacted 
version of the Draft Act.   
A.  The Efficacy of the Draft Defamation Act 
The reception of the Draft Defamation Act was mixed.  While 
many commentators welcomed it as an adequate first step in the re-
formation of English libel laws,165 many others were quick to point 
out its deficiencies.166  In relation to libel tourism, however, the Act 
  
162. Id. annex a, at 6 (clause 8). 
163. See id. at 36–38.   
164. See id. 
165. See, e.g., LRC Welcomes Draft Bill, supra note 136.  For example, Jonathan 
Heawood, Director of English PEN, stated that while English PEN was “delighted 
that the government has delivered a wholesale draft bill . . . it’s essential that this 
opportunity delivers real reform. . . .”  Id.  Similarly, Dr. Evan Harris of the Libel 
Reform Campaign welcomed the draft bill but expressed “that it does not yet re-
flect the extent of full libel reform that is required to properly protect free expres-
sion.”  Id.   
166. The chief criticisms of the Act have been its failures to address the exorbitant 
costs associated with libel litigation, impose restrictions on corporations and po-
werful public figures bringing libel actions, and reverse the presumption that an 
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has been widely praised.167  For example, John Kampfner, Chief Ex-
ecutive of Index on Censorship, haled the Act as “a big step forward 
toward ending the practice of libel tourism . . . .”168  Liberty, a U.K. 
human rights group, similarly declared that it “could help stem fri-
volous or abusive threats of libel and prevent powerful interests 
coming to Britain to shut down criticism and debate.”169 
The Draft Act, however, did not address all of the concerns 
raised by critics and, as will be discussed, it is not without its flaws.  
But the Draft Act’s procedural clauses take effective steps toward 
eliminating libel tourism: Its SPR clause limits the number of actions 
a libel claimant may bring against a publisher, an essential reform in 
the wake of Internet publishing and online news archives; its juris-
dictional clause ensures that there is a substantial connection be-
tween the underlying publication and England; its substantial harm 
clause requires that the claimant actually suffered reputational harm 
due to the publication; and its presumption-of-trial-without-jury 
  
allegedly defamatory statement is false.  See Dominic Crossley, Libel Reform?  
Defamation Is the Least of Our Problems, GUARDIAN, Mar. 16, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/mar/16/libel-reform-defamation-least-of-
problems; Geoffrey Robertson, London Is Still a Town Named Sue, NEW 
STATESMAN (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.newstatesman.com/law-and-
reform/2011/04/libel-bill-media-speech; Georgina Stanley, Libel Reform—Too 
Timid, Too Dangerous, Too Bad, LEGAL WEEK (Mar. 22, 2011), 
http://www.legalweek.com/legal-week/analysis/2036375/libel-reform-timid-
dangerous-bad?WT.rss_f=&WT.rss_a=Libel+reform+-+too+timid%2C+too+ 
dangerous%2C+too+bad.   
167. See Arthur Bright, British Libel Reform—Now With Real Proposed Legisla-
tion!, CITIZEN MEDIA L. PROJECT (Apr. 5, 2011), http://www.citmedialaw.org/ 
blog/2011/british-libel-reform-now-real-proposed-legislation; Katy Dowell, Fo-
cus: Defamation, Clauses Célèbres, LAW. (Mar. 28, 2011), 
http://www.thelawyer.com/focus-defamation-clauses-célèbres/1007461.article 
(“Although a lot’s unclear about libel tourism, it does send a message to foreign 
litigants—come here at your peril . . . .” (quoting Niri Shan)); Roy Greenslade, 
Three Cheers for Libel Reform Bill, GUARDIAN, Mar. 15, 2011, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2011/mar/15/medialaw-kenneth-
clarke (“The draft defamation bill . . . will choke off ‘libel tourism’ . . . .”). 
168. Eric Pfanner, In Britain, Curbing Lawsuits Over Libel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 
2011, at B8. 
169. Press Release, Liberty, Liberty Welcomes Government Moves on Libel 
Reform (Mar. 15, 2011), http://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/media/press/ 
2011/liberty-welcomes-government-moves-on-libel-reform.php. 
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clause could lead to more efficient management of cases, thereby 
reducing the high costs of libel litigation.  Collectively, these clauses 
serve as a strong barrier against libel tourists. 
1. The SPR Clause 
The Draft Act’s SPR clause would sensibly bring English defa-
mation law into the Internet age,170 as its adoption would prevent 
libel tourists (as well as all other libel claimants) from bringing mul-
tiple actions against the same defendant based on subsequent “publi-
cations” of the same material.171  Media defendants, particularly ma-
jor newspapers that maintain online news archives, will likely be the 
most appreciative of the clause because its adoption means that they 
will potentially no longer face separate liability every time that one 
of their articles, containing an allegedly defamatory statement, is 
“published” in England—that is, every time that it is accessed there.  
Rather, a libel claimant will be limited to bringing a single defama-
tion action against the defendant within one year after the defamato-
ry material was first made available. 
But the SPR clause does not entirely absolve defendants from 
separate liability for subsequent publications of the same material.  
Indeed, the clause gives discretion to courts to determine whether a 
subsequent publication is “materially different” from its original 
publication, thereby constituting a separate publication on which a 
new cause of action may be based.172  But neither the explanatory 
notes nor the clause itself provide guidance to courts for situations 
“where older material gains a second life and new exposure” through 
  
170. The SPR clause has been one of the most well-received reforms in the Draft 
Act.  See Siobhain Butterworth, A Minor Triumph for Libel Reform, GUARDIAN, 
Mar. 16, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/2011/mar/16/libel-reform-
medialaw (“If yesterday’s draft defamation bill becomes law and a new single 
publication rule is introduced, it would be a triumph.”); Charlotte Williams, Trade 
Bodies Welcome Libel Law Reform, THEBOOKSELLER.COM (Mar. 21, 2011), 
http://www.thebookseller.com/news/trade-bodies-welcome-libel-law-reform.html. 
171. See CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex a, at 4–5 
(clause 6).  In England, a defamatory statement is “published” every time the 
statement is accessed.  See supra Section II.B.1.a. 
172. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex a, at 4–5 
(clause 6); see supra Section III.A. 
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third parties.173  Because the clause provides English courts a large 
amount of discretion in determining whether a publication is “mate-
rially different” (as well as whether the statute of limitations may be 
extended beyond one year),174 courts could broadly construe the 
“materially different” provision to hold publishers responsible for 
the material’s new level of prominence even when the publishers did 
nothing to draw newfound attention to it.  Ideally, English courts 
will cautiously use their discretion in interpreting this provision in 
order to provide libel defendants with reasonable assurance that 
“stale” claims cannot be brought against them.   
2. The Jurisdictional Clause 
While the SPR clause is an important reform, it is not the Draft 
Defamation Act’s key clause relating to libel tourism.  Rather, the 
Draft Act’s principal measure aimed at eradicating libel tourism is its 
jurisdictional clause, which requires courts to consider the overall 
global context in defamation actions brought against non-resident 
defendants.175  This clause directly serves the Draft Act’s goal of 
combating “the perception that [English] courts are an attractive fo-
rum for libel claimants with little connection to” England because it 
would ensure that all libel actions brought in English courts have a 
legitimate connection to England;176 only if England is “clearly the 
most appropriate” forum will a court exercise jurisdiction.177  But 
this broad language risks the clause being inconsistently applied, 
with some courts finding, and others not finding, that England is the 
most appropriate forum in factually similar scenarios.178  To address 
  
173. The Defamation Bill – Libel Law for the 21st Century?, IP & MEDIA L. (Mar. 
20, 2011), http://ipmedialaw.wordpress.com/2011/03/20/the-defamation-bill-libel-
law-for-the-21st-century. 
174. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex a, at 4–5 
(clause 6); see also id. annex b, at 82 (Explanatory Note paragraph 45). 
175. Id. annex a, at 5–6 (clause 7). 
176. Id. at 3. 
177. Id. 
178. See id.  The explanatory notes indicate that courts will need to consider “a 
range of factors” in making the jurisdictional determination but identify only one 
factor that courts should consider: “whether there is reason to think that the clai-
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this potential problem and provide guidance to courts, the clause 
should be modified to require courts to consider (1) whether the de-
famatory material had a substantial impact in England; and (2) 
whether the defendant intentionally directed the material at England.  
Neither factor should be determinative; rather, an excess in one may 
justify the exercise of jurisdiction despite a deficiency in the other. 
It should first be noted that one of the Draft Act’s explanatory 
notes does address the first proposed factor, noting that courts should 
not exercise jurisdiction where the extent of the defamatory materi-
al’s publication in England is minimal in comparison with the level 
of publication in other jurisdictions.179  Based on this note, courts 
could narrowly interpret the jurisdictional clause and refuse to exer-
cise jurisdiction in actions brought against non-resident defendants 
anytime that the defamatory material at issue was more widely dis-
tributed in another jurisdiction.  Such a result would likely be desira-
ble to U.S. authors and publishers who mainly promote and distri-
bute their works in the United States, as they could still distribute 
their works in England without fear of being sued there, so long as 
the distribution level in England is less than that in the United States.  
This narrow interpretation, however, could also lead to undesirable 
results for U.S. authors and publishers.  Consider the following ex-
ample: A U.S.-based publisher posts a defamatory article, concern-
ing a matter of U.S. public interest unrelated to England, on its web-
site.  Nevertheless, the article proves to be more popular in England 
than the United States, with more English readers accessing it online.  
It would seem unjust for an English court to exercise jurisdiction 
solely on this basis in light of the facts that the article neither con-
cerned nor was directed at England.  Thus, while the extent of the 
material’s distribution in England is certainly a relevant factor, it 
should not be a determinative one.   
  
mant would not receive a fair hearing elsewhere.”  Id. at 34 & annex b., at 83 (Ex-
planatory Note paragraph 47).   
179. See id. annex b, at 83 (Explanatory Note paragraph 47).  In the explanatory 
note’s example, the fact that only 5,000 copies of a publication were published in 
England while 100,000 were published in Australia, would mean that England 
should not have jurisdiction.  Id.  This example seemingly indicates that English 
courts will consider the overall global context even where claimants limit their 
recovery to reputational harm suffered in England. 
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The jurisdictional clause would be clearer and more efficacious 
if it were modified to also require that courts consider whether the 
defendant intentionally directed the defamatory material at England, 
thereby making it reasonable to conclude that the defendant should 
have foreseen that the material could cause reputational harm in 
England.  Merely foreseeing that a publication could reach England, 
however, would, by itself, not support a finding of intentional direc-
tion.  As Professor Robert L. McFarland has argued: 
[F]oreseeability of the transitory nature of speech and its po-
tential for effects elsewhere in the world is an inadequate ba-
sis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the speaker.  
There must be more to establish a nexus between the speaker 
and the foreign forum such that the speaker should foresee 
the foreign nation’s interest in exercising its power over the 
speaker.180 
This Note proposes that the requisite nexus between England and 
a non-resident defendant should exist where the defendant took af-
firmative steps to make defamatory material available in England, 
even if the level of distribution in England is not necessarily as ex-
tensive as that in other jurisdictions.  This standard is justified on the 
basis that non-resident defendants who intentionally direct defamato-
ry material at England should reasonably foresee that England has an 
interest in regulating their conduct and applying its laws.181  While 
direct evidence of a defendant’s intentional direction may not be 
  
180. McFarland, supra note 15, at 638. 
181. See supra Section II.B.1.b.  Professor Trevor C. Hartley has advocated for a 
similar approach in the form of an amendment to U.K. Practice Direction 6B, con-
cerning the serving of a claim form outside of the United Kingdom.  Trevor C. 
Hartley, ‘Libel Tourism’ and Conflict of Laws, 59 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 25, 37 
(2010).  Specifically, he proposes that Rule 3.1(9)—which provides that a tort 
occurs where either damage “was sustained within the jurisdiction” or “resulted 
from an act committed within the jurisdiction”—should not apply in libel actions 
unless the claimant is domiciled in England or “has taken significant steps to make 
the offending material available in England . . . and has targeted that jurisdiction 
more than any other.”  Id. at 29, 37 (citing Practice Direction 6B—Service Out of 
the Jurisdiction, MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/courts-
and-tribunals/courts/procedure-rules/civil/contents/practice_directions/pd_part06 
b.htm (last visited May 1, 2011)). 
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easy for a libel claimant to produce, there are a number of circums-
tantial factors that could be assessed, such as whether the defendant 
modified the material for an English audience, whether the defendant 
has a history of distributing publications in England, and whether the 
publication’s subject matter solely concerned a matter of public in-
terest in England.182 
3. The Substantial Harm Clause 
Even if the jurisdictional clause remains unmodified and its ap-
plication uncertain, the Draft Defamation Act’s substantial harm 
clause poses another barrier to libel tourism.  The clause replaces the 
presumption that a defamatory statement harms a libel claimant’s 
reputation with the requirement that claimants prove that the state-
ment substantially harmed (or will substantially harm) their reputa-
tions.183  This requirement has the ability to be instrumental to the 
curbing of libel tourism.  By requiring courts to analyze the serious-
ness of the statement at issue and whether that statement could nega-
tively affect the claimant’s reputation with respect to the statement’s 
subject matter,184 the clause could lead to the early dismissal of im-
proper libel-tourism and other frivolous libel actions that were able 
to survive the jurisdictional inquiry.   
But the clause should be clarified.  English case law already re-
quires courts to determine that libel actions involve a “threshold of 
seriousness” and to dismiss actions where that threshold is not satis-
  
182. The latter factor corresponds with one of the Act’s explanatory notes, which 
states that an English court’s exercise of jurisdiction is more likely to be unreason-
able where the subject matter of the publication concerned foreign matters to 
which England has no interest.  CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra 
note 9, annex b, at 35 (Explanatory Note paragraph 86).   
183. Id. annex a, at 1 (clause 1). 
184. See Dario Milo, UK Defamation Bill Paves the Way for South Africa, 
INFORRM’S BLOG (Apr. 6, 2011), http://inforrm.wordpress.com/2011/04/06/uk-
defamation-bill-paves-the-way-for-south-africa-dario-milo (“If, for example, a 
convicted mass murderer sues over an allegation that he is a disgraceful human 
being, such an allegation is not likely to cause substantial harm to the reputation of 
the claimant given his existing bad reputation.  A substantial harm test would en-
sure that such a claimant would not even get out of the starting blocks in a defama-
tion case.”). 
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fied.185  It is unclear whether the substantial harm clause is intended 
to establish a higher threshold in libel actions or whether the clause 
is meant to merely codify the current state of the case law.  Moreo-
ver, neither the clause nor the Draft Act’s explanatory notes provide 
any guidance to courts on how to assess whether substantial harm 
has occurred (or is likely to occur).186  Therefore, it is unclear how 
claimants are to make a showing of “substantial harm.” 
4. Concluding Thoughts 
Finally, the Draft Defamation Act does not take any explicit 
steps to reduce the excessive costs associated with libel litigation.  
Some proponents of English libel reform have emphasized that “the 
real issue with libel is not the law itself but that in practice it has be-
come too expensive to pursue,” thereby allowing “rich claimants to 
tactically use costs as a weapon.”187  Others have called for the adop-
tion of caps on attorneys’ fees.188  But, in relation to this issue, the 
Draft Act’s presumption-of-trial-without-jury clause should not be 
overlooked.  By allowing judges to preside over defamation trials, 
the Draft Act aims to create more effective management of libel cas-
es from the onset, thereby leading to early dismissals of frivolous or 
improper actions.189  While this will likely result in frontloading of 
costs,190 frontloading is not necessarily a bad thing.191  In fact, it may 
  
185. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex b, at 73 (Ex-
planatory Note paragraph 7). 
186. For example, must an actor prove that he lost (or will lose) a film role?  Must 
a company show that its profits dropped (or are likely to drop)?   
187. Stanley, supra note 166. 
188. See Reforming Libel: What Should a Defamation Bill Contain?, LIBEL 
REFORM CAMPAIGN 2 (Mar. 10, 2011), http://www.senseaboutscience.org.uk/ 
PDF/What%20should%20a%20defamation%20bill%20contain.pdf. 
189. Barrister Adam Speker, for example, has indicated that the removal of the 
right to trial by jury in conjunction with the substantial harm clause could have 
“quite an impact on practice, procedure and—at least in the longer term—costs.”  
Dowell, supra note 167. 
190. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, at 8; Dowell, supra 
note 167 (“Substantial harm means a huge amount of frontloading on costs be-
cause there’ll be interlocutory hearings about what has to be disclosed to show the 
harm.”). 
191. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, at 8. 
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send a clear message to libel tourists that the English courts are no 
longer hospitable to their claims.  Moreover, while the Draft Act 
raises numerous questions of interpretation, it is important to note 
that the Draft Act is currently under pre-legislative review and will 
likely be substantially altered before being enacted.192  Therefore, it 
is likely that a subsequent version of the Act will address some of 
the major concerns with the current version.  
B.  Considering Choice of Law 
To help further the Draft Defamation Act’s aim to eliminate libel 
tourism in England, a rule on choice of law could be adopted, requir-
ing English courts to apply foreign laws in limited circumstances.  
The adoption of a choice-of-law rule akin to the place-of-harm ap-
proach proposed for the Rome II Regulation193 would provide a safe-
ty net of sorts for non-resident libel defendants who are sued in Eng-
land because the English court would need to determine whether the 
application of English defamation laws is appropriate before auto-
matically applying them.     
Under current English choice-of-law rules, defamatory material 
published in another country is “actionable in England if, and only 
if, it is actionable under the foreign law . . . [and] actionable as a tort 
under English law.”194  English courts will apply English laws in the 
resulting actions only if the claimants limit their claims to harm they 
suffered in England, which virtually all claimants do.195  As a result, 
English laws apply in defamation actions even where the underlying 
publication was more widely distributed in another jurisdiction.196 
  
192. See id. at 4 (encouraging all interested persons to take part in the consulta-
tion). 
193. The Rome II Regulation, binding on all members of the European Union, 
including the United Kingdom, applies to non-contractual actions.  Warshaw, su-
pra note 1, at 273–74.  A defamation choice-of-law provision was proposed but 
removed after E.U. Members failed to agree on how the provision should be 
drafted.  Id. at 274; see also Hartley, supra note 181, at 35.   
194. Hartley, supra note 181, at 27.  This rule is known as the “double-
actionability” rule.  Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
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The adoption of a defamation-specific choice-of-law rule would 
be a small step that could go a long way in legitimizing English de-
famation judgments in the minds of critics who view English defa-
mation laws as repugnant to First Amendment principles.  Addition-
ally, the inclusion of such a rule in the Draft Defamation Act could 
earn instantaneous goodwill with U.S. courts, which have been will-
ing to apply English law in cases where England has a greater inter-
est in having its laws applied.197  For example, in Love v. Associated 
Newspapers, Ltd.,198 the Ninth Circuit chose to apply English law in 
an action brought by Beach Boys member Brian Wilson against the 
English newspaper Mail on Sunday because nearly all of the news-
papers had been distributed in England and because California had 
no legitimate interest in having its laws applied.199   
To find a suitable choice-of-law clause for the Draft Defamation 
Act, one may need to look no further than a provision that was in-
tended for, but ultimately not included in Rome II.  The first draft of 
Rome II included a place-of-harm choice-of-law approach for defa-
mation claims, providing that the applicable law is 
the law of the country in which the most significant element 
or elements of the loss or damage occur or are likely to occur 
. . . . [B]ut a manifestly closer connection with a particular 
country may be deemed to exist having regard to factors such 
as the country to which a publication or broadcast is princi-
pally directed or the language of the publication or broadcast 
or sales or audience size in a given country as a proportion of 
  
197. See Richard Garnett & Megan Richardson, Libel Tourism Or Just Redress? 
Reconciling the (English) Right to Reputation with the (American) Right to Free 
Speech in Cross-Border Libel Cases, 5 J. PRIVATE INT’L L. 471, 472 (2009) (“In 
terms of choice of law, the [United States] does not apply a strict law of the place 
of publication rule but instead seeks the law of the state which, with respect to the 
particular issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the 
parties.”). 
198. 611 F.3d 601 (9th Cir. 2010). 
199. Id. at 610–11 (“Even if California has an interest in protecting the right of an 
entertainer with economic ties to the state . . . that interest is not nearly as signifi-
cant as England’s interest in (not) regulating the distribution of millions of copies 
of a newspaper and millions of compact discs by a British paper primarily in the 
United Kingdom.”). 
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total sales or audience size or a combination of these fac-
tors.200 
While a choice-of-law rule, in practice, could be just as difficult 
to apply as the Draft Act’s jurisdictional and substantial harm claus-
es, its inclusion in the Draft Act is a worthwhile consideration be-
cause it would serve the legitimate function of forcing English courts 
to consider the overall global context of the underlying defamatory 
publication.  Importantly, it could result in an English court applying 
the laws of a foreign country that has a greater interest in the out-
come of the case, even where the English court’s exercise of juris-
diction is proper. 
C.  American  Enough?:   The  Enforcement  of  Future  English  
Defamation Judgments 
As discussed in Part A, the Draft Defamation Act has the poten-
tial to reduce the prevalence of libel tourism in England and is cer-
tainly a step towards the harmonization of U.S. and English defama-
tion procedures, as evidenced by its adoption of the SPR and limita-
tion on the exercise of jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.201  
Arguably, the Draft Act is also a step towards the convergence of 
U.S. and English defamation laws, as its substantive clauses—
particularly its defense for the responsible publication of defamatory 
statements concerning matters of public interest202—would make 
English defamation laws more defendant friendly.203  Nevertheless, 
in light of the SPEECH Act’s restrictive language, the prospect of 
  
200. Warshaw, supra note 1, at 294–95.  The place-of-harm rule was ultimately 
removed because publishing groups feared that the rule “would make it necessary 
to employ legal advisors with expertise in each foreign jurisdiction, which would 
create practical and financial burdens in addition to a chilling effect caused by 
self-censorship out of fear of suit under foreign defamation laws.”  Id.  A later-
introduced place-of-publication rule was also scrapped, and the defamation provi-
sion was ultimately entirely excluded from Rome II.  Id. 
201. See supra Sections II.B,  IV.A. 
202. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex a, at 1–2 
(clause 2). 
203. See MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 258–61 (arguing that the protections af-
forded to libel defendants by U.S. defamation laws and the Reynolds privilege are 
functionally similar). 
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U.S. courts recognizing or enforcing future English defamation 
judgments rendered in accordance with the Draft Defamation Act 
(or, rather, the version of the Draft Act that is ultimately enacted) is 
dubious.  This Note proposes that, to the extent possible, U.S. courts 
applying the SPEECH Act should focus less on determining whether 
the substantive law applied in the foreign proceeding comports with 
all of the technicalities of U.S. defamation laws and more on wheth-
er the foreign country applied laws that serve an overarching goal 
similar to that of U.S. laws. 
Sections 4102(b)(1) and 4102(a)(1)(A) of the SPEECH Act bar a 
U.S. court from recognizing or enforcing a foreign defamation 
judgment unless the U.S. court is satisfied that (1) the foreign court’s 
exercise of jurisdiction over the U.S. defendant comported with U.S. 
due process requirements and (2) the law applied by the foreign 
court provided at least as much protection for free speech as the law 
that the U.S. court would have applied, respectively.204  Section 
4102(b)(1)’s jurisdictional requirement will likely be a non-issue in 
future enforcement actions involving English defamation judgments 
because of the Draft Defamation Act’s robust jurisdictional 
clause.205  Section 4102(a)(1)(A) is more problematic.  Even if the 
English court’s exercise of jurisdiction comports with U.S. due 
process requirements, a U.S. court applying § 4102(a)(1)(A) would 
likely still not enforce the judgment because the English court ap-
plied defamation laws divergent from U.S. defamation laws.206  The 
  
204. 28 U.S.C. §§ 4102(a)(1)(A), (b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2010 Sess.).  
The SPEECH Act, particularly § 4102(a)(1)(A), has sparked controversy, with 
several scholars lambasting it as improperly imposing U.S. free-speech standards 
on other countries.  See McFarland, supra note 15, at 662 (“England’s substantive 
speech jurisprudence, while certainly in conflict with American jurisprudence, is 
not irrational.  Unless it is conceded that there is a supreme international law, then 
it is not possible to demand English adherence to” U.S. standards); Rendleman, 
supra note 2, at 487 (“The idea . . . that a foreign nation’s substantive law is ‘re-
pugnant’ unless it is identical to ours is itself a repugnant one.”).  These commen-
tators fear that the SPEECH Act will have negative implications on principles of 
comity and, concomitantly, foreign relations.  See Klein, supra note 64, at 387–91; 
McFarland, supra note 15, at 666–67; Rendleman, supra note 2, at 484–87. 
205. See CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, annex a, at 5–6 
(clause 7); supra Section IV.A.   
206. See, e.g., Heather Maly, Note, Publish At Your Own Risk Or Don’t Publish 
At All: Forum Shopping Trends in Libel Litigation Leave the First Amendment 
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core divergence is that English law presumes that allegedly defama-
tory statements are false, thereby placing the burden on the defen-
dant to prove the statement’s truth, while U.S. law presumes that 
such statements are true and requires the claimant to prove their fal-
sity and, in some cases, that the defendant acted with actual ma-
lice.207  This divergence has been the chief reason why U.S. courts 
have refused to enforce English defamation judgments in cases pre-
dating the SPEECH Act.208  The Draft Defamation Act does nothing 
to address it, leaving the presumption of falsity in place.   
Whether U.S. courts will interpret § 4102(a)(1)(A) to require ex-
act congruence between U.S. laws and the foreign laws at issue is 
entirely speculative, as no U.S. court has yet interpreted the 
SPEECH Act.209  But such an interpretation is entirely plausible.  
Professor Harry Melkonian has suggested that § 4102(a)(1)(A) shifts 
a U.S. court’s inquiry from assessing whether “the foreign law [is] 
repugnant to American public policy” to deciding “the infinitely 
more obtuse question—are the laws equal.”210  And the SPEECH 
Act’s legislative history indicates that whether the foreign law ap-
plied a presumption of falsity will be an essential consideration and, 
possibly, a deal breaker.  For example, in introducing the Act, Con-
  
Un-Guaranteed, 14 J. L. & POL’Y 883, 916 (2006) (“Most foreign judgments in 
libel suits have . . . not been enforced in the [United States], as the judgments are 
considered repugnant to our Constitution.  These decisions recognize that attempts 
to chill speech do not comport with the protections afforded by the First Amend-
ment . . . .”). 
207. See supra Section II.B.2. 
208. See, e.g., Telnikoff v. Matusevitch, 702 A.2d 230, 249 (Md. 1997) (refusing 
to enforce Telnikoff’s English defamation judgment in part because: “Telnikoff 
was not required to prove that Matusevitch’s letter contained a false statement of 
fact, which would have been required under . . . Maryland law.  Instead, falsity 
was presumed, and the defendant had the risky choice of whether to attempt to 
prove truth.”); Bachchan v. India Abroad Publ’ns, Inc., 585 N.Y.S.2d 661, 664 
(N.Y. Super. Ct. 1992) (refusing to enforce Bachchan’s English defamation judg-
ment because “the failure of Bachchan to prove falsity in the High Court of Justice 
in England makes his judgment unenforceable here”). 
209. But see Pontigon v. Lord, No. ED 95677, 2011 WL 1522565, at *1, 5 (Apr. 
19, 2011) (reversing and remanding the registration of a Canadian defamation 
judgment because the lower court did not review and apply 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101–05 
as well as other relevant laws). 
210. MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 262. 
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gressman Steve Cohen emphasized that English defamation laws are 
“contrary to our own constitutional tradition,” using the presumption 
of falsity as his prime example.211  Thus, a narrow construction of 
§ 4102(a)(1)(A), requiring that the foreign law at issue did not apply 
a presumption of falsity, is likely.  A danger of this type of construc-
tion is that even if England abolished the presumption, any “minor 
deviations from [U.S.] case law interpreting the First Amendment” 
could still render an English judgment unenforceable.212   
Conversely, a broader construction of § 4102(a)(1)(A), focusing 
on whether the foreign law comports with the First Amendment’s 
chief aim of preserving “uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” de-
bate,213 rather than whether all of the numerous defamation rules 
developed by U.S. courts are applied, could lead to at least some 
English defamation judgments being enforced in the United States—
even if the presumption of falsity remains.214  This type of construc-
tion should be applied, at least in relation to future English defama-
tion judgments, because, if nothing else, the SPEECH Act was in-
tended to serve a pro-speech function: specifically, to encourage 
U.S. authors and publishers to not be inhibited by other countries’ 
  
211. 156 CONG. REC. H6127 (daily ed. July 27, 2010) (statement of Rep. Cohen). 
212. Klein, supra note 64, at 389 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Professor 
Andrew R. Klein has posited the following illustrative question: “Sullivan states 
that plaintiffs should prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence.  Does 
this mean that if England changes its defamation rules . . . but permits a plaintiff to 
prove a fault standard by a preponderance of the evidence, all judgments would be 
categorically unenforceable?”  Id. at 390 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
213. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–71 (1964). 
214. Professor Melkonian has argued that the Reynolds defense, which is essen-
tially codified in the Draft Defamation Act’s second clause, “does indeed provide 
‘as much protection for freedom of speech’ as the First Amendment because the 
Reynolds standard immunises more types of speech from defamation liability than 
does the” U.S. actual-malice standard.  MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 259; see also 
Butterworth, supra note 170 (noting that “[t]he creation of a public interest de-
fence doesn’t add much to the Reynolds privilege”).  He has also indicated that the 
SPEECH Act’s requirement that U.S. courts consider the specific facts of the case 
at hand should allow for U.S. courts to enforce foreign defamation judgments 
where “the underlying publication is unrelated to the United States or the interests 
of its citizens and the defendant purposefully availed itself of foreign markets.”  
MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 257.  In such a situation, the foreign law would be 
“equivalent to First Amendment in the circumstances of that case.”  Id.      
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speech-restrictive laws.  The Act allows for this by preventing U.S. 
authors and publishers from being forced to comply with foreign 
judgments that are inconsistent with First Amendment jurisprudence.  
As a result, foreign-judgment creditors cannot force a U.S. author or 
publisher to comply with “un-American” judgments.  But the Act 
does nothing to prevent those creditors from forcing U.S. authors 
and publishers, who may have assets in the foreign country at issue, 
to comply with the judgment in that country.215  With most major 
U.S.-based publishers holding assets in the United Kingdom, the 
efficacy of this function is dubious.216   
Perhaps, then, the most valuable function of the SPEECH Act is 
that it has placed added pressure on English policymakers to reform 
English libel laws and procedures.217  The Draft Defamation Act’s 
explanatory notes directly refer to the SPEECH Act as evidence of 
the “widespread perception” of libel tourism and its resulting chill-
ing effect on free expression.218  And in introducing the Draft Defa-
mation Act, U.K. Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg emphasized: 
“These reforms will create libel laws that will be a foundation for 
free speech, instead of an international embarrassment.  In a modern, 
liberal and open society dissent should be celebrated, and debate 
should be raucous.  The press should be free—and in our society, 
they will be.”219  Even the most ardent free-speech enthusiasts would 
be hard pressed to find fault with Clegg’s goals for the Draft Act.   
As a result, even if the Draft Act’s reforms do not bring English 
defamation laws into exact congruence with U.S. laws, in enforce-
ment proceedings involving English defamation judgments, U.S. 
courts should carefully consider England’s interest in the case at is-
  
215. Mark A. Fischer & Franklin Levy, The SPEECH Act: Speaking Softly?, 
DUANE MORRIS (Oct. 12, 2010), http://www.duanemorris.com/articles/speech_ 
act_libel_ laws_3841.html.   
216. Id. 
217. See Roy Greenslade, Obama Seals Off US Journalists and Authors from 
Britain’s Libel Laws, GUARDIAN, Aug. 11, 2010, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/greenslade/2010/aug/11/medialaw-barack-
obama (“The US’s response to our libel laws has already played a key role in ad-
vancing the campaign for reform in the UK.”) (quoting Jo Glanville, editor of the 
Index on Censorship). 
218. CONSULTATION PAPER AND DRAFT BILL, supra note 9, at 33 (paragraph 79).  
219. Clegg, supra note 7, at 33. 
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sue as well as the Draft Act’s goal of preserving “uninhibited, ro-
bust, and wide-open” debate before denying enforcement.  The Eng-
lish presumption of falsity, although certainly in conflict with fun-
damental principles of U.S. defamation laws, is one justifiable way 
to balance the right to free expression against the need to protect 
reputation.  To further the longstanding principles of comity and ex-
tend respect to England’s reform efforts, U.S. courts should carefully 
assess England’s interest in having its laws applied—as well as the 
overall purpose and effect of those laws—before declaring English 
laws insufficient or not “American enough.” 
V. PRIVACY: THE NEW LIBEL CLAIM? 
On March 30, 2008, the following headline engulfed the front 
page of the U.K. tabloid News of the World: “F1 Boss Has Sick Nazi 
Orgy With 5 Hookers.”220  Those salacious words and the corres-
ponding article referred to Max Mosley, the Formula One President 
and son of Nazi sympathizer Oswald Mosley.221  The article’s alle-
gations included that Mosley had a “depraved Nazi-style orgy in a 
torture dungeon” with five hookers on March 28, 2008, during which 
he “bark[ed] orders in German as he lash[ed] girls wearing mock 
death camp uniforms . . . .”222  Additionally, the newspaper pub-
lished several photos from the March 28 incident that were obtained 
from a secret video recording.223  Mosley filed suit against News of 
the World, and the High Court ultimately determined that “there was 
no evidence that the gathering . . . was intended to be an enactment 
of Nazi behavior or adoption of any of its attitudes.”224  After being 
awarded an unprecedented £60,000 in damages, Mosley told the 
  
220. Mosley v. News Group Newspapers Ltd., [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777, [1] 
(Eng.). 
221. Id. at [1], [154]. 
222. Id. at [26]. 
223. Id. at [27].  Two photos were described as depicting a “medical inspection,” 
which was described as “mocking the humiliating way Jews were treated by SS 
death camp guards in WWII.”  Id. at [31].  The following week, News of the World 
published a follow-up article, repeatedly alleging that the March 28 incident had a 
Nazi theme.  Id. at [36]. 
224. Id. at [232]. 
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press that the judgment “demonstrates that [News of the World’s] 
Nazi lie was completely invented and had no justification.”225  Al-
though the case hinged on whether the Nazi allegations were false, 
Mosley’s action against News of the World was not for defamation; 
rather, it was for breach of privacy.226 
Mosley’s case demonstrates that the line between English libel 
and privacy actions is becoming blurred and that the laws are morph-
ing into a “protection of reputation lump.”227  While both libel and 
privacy laws are related to the protection of reputation, they are dif-
ferent in that libel actions are based on reputational harms caused by 
the publication of falsities while privacy actions are based on reputa-
tional harms caused by the publication of truths that are embarrass-
ing or very personal.228  But as exemplified by the plights of public 
figures like former South Carolina governor Mark Sanford and sing-
er Britney Spears, the publication of truthful information can be just 
as damaging to one’s reputation as the publication of lies.229 
One of the major criticisms of the Draft Defamation Act has 
been that it failed to address English privacy laws, which are now 
  
225. Siobhain Butterworth, Privacy, Libel or Protection of Reputation?, 
GUARDIAN, Apr. 8, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/butterworth-and-
bowcott-on-law/2011/apr/08/privacy-libel-protection-of-reputation. 
226. Mosley argued that “the content of the published material was inherently 
private, . . . that there had been a pre-existing relationship of confidence between 
the participants, such that the woman who filmed the event breached that confi-
dence and that the journalist concerned must have appreciated that the woman was 
so doing.”  See Mosley, [2008] EWHC (QB) 1777 at [5]. 
227. Butterworth, supra note 225 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
228. See MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 279. 
229. In June 2009, Mark Sanford, the Republican governor of South Carolina, 
became “a national laughingstock” after the press widely reported his six-day dis-
appearance and then his admission to having an affair with an Argentine woman.  
Mark Sanford, TIMES TOPICS, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/ref 
erence/timestopics/people/s/mark_sanford/index.html (last updated Nov. 10, 
2010).  Similarly, the reputation of singer Britney Spears was in shambles 
throughout 2007, as the media was “busily writing off Ms. Spears because of her 
bizarre behavior—her public scenes, questionable parenting skills and a shaky 
comeback performance at the MTV Awards—and her tortured personal life after 
divorcing her former backup dancer, Kevin Federline.”  Britney Spears, TIMES 
TOPICS, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/ 
people/s/britney_spears/index.html (last visited May 1, 2011).   
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the focus of much litigation involving media defendants.230  Some 
English media lawyers have indicated that English privacy laws pose 
a larger threat to free speech than libel laws.231  One lawyer has spe-
culated that, if the Draft Act closes the English courts to wealthy and 
powerful claimants, they will simply “shoehorn what are defamation 
claims into privacy actions.”232  And evidence suggests that they 
may already be doing so.233  For example, London media lawyer 
Mark Stephens has remarked on the potential proliferation of “priva-
cy tourism,” indicating that he has seen “seven threatening letters 
sent by London law firms to American media and internet sites about 
photos taken of American citizens in America.”234 
Ironically, the Draft Defamation Act may end the problem of li-
bel tourism only to create the problem of privacy tourism.  This un-
intended result is possible for two reasons.  First, as demonstrated by 
Mosley’s privacy action against News of the World, both privacy and 
libel actions are often based on the publication of embarrassing ma-
terial that individuals would prefer to keep private.  Thus, many libel 
actions could alternatively be brought as privacy actions in which 
falsity need not be proven.  Consider, for example, a 2005 National 
Enquirer story that alleged that U.S. actress Cameron Diaz had an 
affair with a married man and included a photo of her embracing the 
  
230. See Duncan Lamont, Freedom of Speech Triumphant?, CHARLES RUSSELL 
(Mar. 30, 2011), http://www.charlesrussell.co.uk/UserFiles/file/pdf/Media% 
20&%20Entertainment/Freedom.pdf; see also Frances Gibb, Writers To Be 
Shielded from Threat of Libel, TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 16, 2011, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article2947717.ece (“[P]rivacy laws, which are 
increasingly used by the rich and powerful, will not be included in the re-
forms . . . .”). 
231. Frances Gibb, Will Privacy Be the New Libel?, TIMES (U.K.), Mar. 16, 2011, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/columnists/article2948528.ece. 
232. Id. (statement of Niri Shan of Taylor Wessing). 
233. See Frances Gibb, MPs ‘Gagged’ as the Rich and Famous Wage a Privacy 
War, TIMES (U.K.), Apr. 2, 2011, http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article 
2970636.ece (discussing the rise in gag orders granted by English courts to protect 
the private lives of celebrities and other public figures from being reported in the 
press). 
234. Libel Tourism: Writ Large, supra note 27, at 48. 
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man.235  Diaz denied the story and, in a prototypical case of libel 
tourism, brought a libel action against the tabloid, which ultimately 
settled.236  Alternatively, Diaz could have brought a privacy action 
against the tabloid, alleging that it invaded her privacy by publishing 
intimate details of her personal life as well as a photo of her in a 
place where she had a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Should the 
Draft Defamation Act result in less attractive English libel laws, the 
latter option may, indeed, become the most practical one.  
Second, like English libel laws, English privacy laws are much 
more plaintiff friendly than those of the United States.  Unlike U.S. 
privacy laws, under which the First Amendment interests of the 
press generally outweigh the privacy interests of individuals, espe-
cially public figures like Diaz,237 English privacy laws, modeled af-
ter the European Convention on Human Rights, state that privacy 
rights and freedom of expression “are of equal value.”238  But in the 
past decade, English courts have given privacy an expansive applica-
tion, seemingly favoring individuals’ privacy rights over press free-
  
235. Ian Herbert, Celebrities Flock to ‘More Favourable’ British Courts to Sue 
for Libel, INDEP., Aug. 2, 2007, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/ 
celebrities-flock-to-more-favourable-british-courts-to-sue-for-libel-459934.html.   
236. Id.  This case is an example of libel tourism because both Diaz and the Na-
tional Enquirer were domiciled in the United States, the article was not of particu-
lar relevance to England, and it had only been accessed 279 times by U.K. Internet 
users.  Maurice Chittenden & Steven Swinford, Libel Threat to Force Papers Out 
of Britain, TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 8, 2009, http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/ 
business/article189837.ece. 
237. Gary Wax, Popping Britney’s Personal Safety Bubble: Why Proposed Anti-
Paparazzi Ordinances in Los Angeles Cannot Withstand First Amendment Scruti-
ny, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 133, 140 (2009).  Generally, in the United States, 
individuals have no right to privacy when they are in public places.  Id.  The U.S. 
right to privacy has evolved into four separate torts: “(1) intrusion upon seclusion; 
(2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light; and (4) appropriation (of name 
or likeness).”  Id. at 141.  
238. Patrick J. Alach, Paparazzi and Privacy, 28 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 205, 220 
(2008).  In 2000, the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) was for-
mally incorporated into English law.  See Maya Ganguly, Comment, Private Pic-
tures, Public Exposure: Paparazzi, Compromising Images, and Privacy Law on 
the Internet, 26 WIS. INT’L L.J. 1140, 1149 (2009).  ECHR Article 10 “ensures 
freedom of expression while recognizing that there are restrictions to this freedom, 
namely the privacy of others,” which is discussed in Article 8.  Id. at 1148. 
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dom.239  For example, in 2004, the House of Lords held that the Mir-
ror newspaper had unlawfully infringed on supermodel Naomi 
Campbell’s right to privacy and breached a duty of confidence after 
it printed an article, stating that she was receiving treatment for drug 
addiction, as well as photos of her, on a public street, leaving a Nar-
cotics Anonymous meeting.240  Lord Hope of Craighead reasoned 
that a person of ordinary sensibilities in Campbell’s position would 
have found the publication of the article and photos offensive and 
that Campbell’s treatment for addiction was akin to private and con-
fidential information.241  Similarly, in 2010, Hello! magazine settled 
a privacy action with actor Jude Law based on the publication of 
photos of him and his children on a public beach, agreeing to pay 
him £9,500 in damages and not to publish any photos of him in plac-
es where he has a reasonable expectation of privacy or of his child-
ren until they reach the age of eighteen.242  Such results would be 
unfathomable in the United States, where magazines regularly pub-
lish stories concerning celebrities’ addictions and photos of celebri-
ties and their children. 
English privacy laws are becoming increasingly controversial 
and, simultaneously, attractive to public figures because of the rise 
of the “super-injunction,”243 a type of gag order that forbids the press 
  
239. See MELKONIAN, supra note 2, at 289. 
240. See Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2] (appeal taken from Eng.). 
241. Id. at [124]. 
242. Mark Sweney, Hello! Pays Jude Law Privacy Damages, GUARDIAN, Apr. 8, 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2010/apr/08/hello-jude-law-privacy-
damages.  J.K. Rowling, the author of the immensely popular Harry Potter book 
series, won a landmark case in England, which established that English privacy 
laws protect the children of celebrities from the publication of unauthorized pho-
tos, unless their parents have exposed them to publicity.  Clare Dyer, JK Rowling 
Wins Ban on Photos of Her Son, GUARDIAN, May 8, 2008, at 5. 
243. See David Leppard, Prime Minister To Be Told Gagging Cannot Be 
Scrapped, TIMES (U.K.), Apr. 24, 2011, http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/ 
news/uk_news/ Society/article611417.ece; Roland Watson & Richard Ford, Ca-
meron ‘Uneasy’ Over UK Privacy Laws, TIMES (U.K.), Apr. 22, 2011, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article2994681.ece.  Alan Rusbridger, the editor 
of the Guardian, penned the term “super-injunction” after the Guardian was pro-
hibited from reporting the contents of an internal report of the oil trader Trafigura.  
Roy Greenslade, Law Is Badly in Need of Reform as Celebrities Hide Secrets, 
EVENING STANDARD, Apr. 20, 2011, http://www.thisislondon.co.uk/markets/article 
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from reporting the injunction’s very existence, let alone the details 
giving rise to it.244  Recently, the U.K. press has used the super-
injunction term more broadly to refer to gag orders obtained by 
usually male celebrities, athletes, and businessmen to prevent their 
adulteries from being publicized.245  As of May 2011, it is estimated 
that thirty-five such injunctions have been granted.246  And, in a con-
troversial decision issued on April 20, 2011, Justice Eady granted a 
rare “contra mundum order”—effectively, a worldwide ban—barring 
a woman from selling intimate pictures of a well-known man.247  
Justice Eady justified the order on the basis that it would “protect the 
mental health of the man and his family. . . . It is thought to be the 
first time such an order has been related to the details of an individu-
al’s private life.”248  While it is not known whether a non-U.K. indi-
vidual has successfully obtained a super-injunction, at the rather rap-
id rate that English courts are granting them, it is reasonably likely 
that a non-U.K. public figure will try to do so at some point.249 
Ultimately, with the Draft Defamation Act making English libel 
laws less plaintiff friendly, it is entirely possible that London will 
soon no longer be a libel haven for foreign claimants.  While libel 
  
-23943177-law-is-badly-in-need-of-reform-as-celebrities-hide-secrets.do; Alan 
Rusbridger, Trafigura: Anatomy of a Super-Injunction, GUARDIAN, Oct. 20, 2009, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2009/oct/20/trafigura-anatomy-super-injunction. 
244. See Greenslade, supra note 243; Rusbridger, supra note 243.  
245. See Greenslade, supra note 243; Leppard, supra note 243.  Some of the in-
junctions granted to public figures have been traditional super-injunctions, “where 
even the existence of a court order can’t be disclosed.”  Frances Gibb & Michael 
Savage, Judges Humiliated by One Little Tweet, TIMES (U.K.), May 10, 2011, 
http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/law/article3013669.ece.   
246. Gibb & Savage, supra note 245.  For example, on April 20, 2011, a Premier 
League footballer was granted a super-injunction, preventing Imogen Thomas, a 
former Miss Wales and star of Big Brother, from revealing details of their six-
month affair.  Leppard, supra note 243. 
247. Watson & Ford, supra note 243. 
248. Id.    
249. The efficacy of super-injunctions—and English privacy laws in general—
“were thrown into turmoil” in May 2011, when a user of the social networking site 
Twitter published the names of several celebrities who allegedly had obtained 
super-injunctions to hide scandalous information.  Gibb & Savage, supra note 245.  
This circumvention of the gag orders has “prompted immediate calls for an over-
haul of the privacy laws,” with U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron calling for a 
more effective balance of privacy and free expression.  Id.   
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tourists may react to this development by bringing libel actions in 
other jurisdictions,250 it is also possible that they will begin to morph 
their libel actions into privacy actions, as it is just as easy for inti-
mate or embarrassing truths to cross international borders as it is for 
defamatory falsehoods.  Thus, as England focuses on stripping Lon-
don of its status as the global libel capital via reformation of its libel 
laws, without addressing the concerns posed by its privacy laws, it 
risks London being one day dubbed the privacy capital of the world. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Draft Defamation Act is an important piece of legislation 
that has received a great deal of media attention in early 2011.  It 
marks an important first step in the curbing of libel tourism in Lon-
don as well as the reformation of English libel laws in general.  In 
this Note, I have sought to contribute to the scholarship regarding 
libel tourism by examining the prevalence and dangers of libel tour-
ism, analyzing the English and U.S. legislative reactions to it, and 
making my own proposals.  Libel tourism poses a threat to free ex-
pression, and, while the SPEECH Act and the Draft Defamation Act 
take steps to protect authors and publishers from it, neither Act is 
without flaws.  The SPEECH Act poses comity concerns, especially 
if it is narrowly construed and applied.  And the Draft Defamation 
  
250. Libel tourism has not been exclusive to England.  In the past two years, high-
profile libel-tourism actions have been brought in Australia, France, and Germany.  
See Kai Falkenberg, Libel Tourism Spreads to Germany, FORBES (Mar. 22, 2010), 
http://blogs.forbes.com/docket/2010/03/22/libel-tourism-spreads-to-germany (dis-
cussing a libel suit brought against the New York Times in the German Federal 
Court of Justice); Libel Tourism, LAW REPORT (Nov. 10, 2009), 
http://www.abc.net.au/rn/lawreport/stories/2009/2737300.htm (discussing a libel 
suit brought by a U.S. company in Australia against a U.K. blogger); Peter Wood, 
Libel Tourism En Vacances, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCHOLARS (Mar. 15, 2010), 
http://www.nas.org/polArticles.cfm?doc_id=1211 (discussing a criminal defama-
tion suit brought in the Tribunal Grande Instance de Paris against New York Uni-
versity School of Law Professor Joseph Weiler); see also Charles Arthur, Evony 
Drops Libel Case Against British Blogger Bruce Everiss, GUARDIAN, Mar. 31, 
2010, http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2010/mar/31/evony-libel-case-bruce-
everiss; Adam Liptak, From Four Paragraphs of Mild Criticism to a Criminal 
Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2011, at A14. 
 
File: Sanchez - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V2 Created on: 5/31/2011 12:24:00 AM Last Printed: 5/31/2011 12:24:00 AM 
2011 LONDON, LIBEL CAPITAL NO LONGER? 521 
Act does not address some major issues, particularly the high costs 
of libel litigation and the abolition of the presumption of falsity.  
Despite its imperfections, I conclude that the Draft Act’s procedural 
clauses present an effective barrier to libel tourists.  But modifying 
the Draft Act to more clearly define the jurisdictional and substantial 
harm clauses and to include a choice-of-law rule would help bolster 
the Draft Act’s aim to eradicate libel tourism. 
Domestic legislation, however, can only go so far to address an 
international problem.  Just as the Draft Defamation Act’s reforms 
might not result in the enforcement of English defamation judgments 
by U.S. courts, the Draft Act cannot prevent libel tourists from 
bringing their actions in other jurisdictions with favorable libel laws 
and procedures.  Moreover, neither the Draft Act nor the SPEECH 
Act considers other laws concerning the protection of reputation, 
namely privacy.  Thus, strategic libel tourists may continue to use 
the English courts—to the dismay of U.S. and other non-English 
authors and publishers—by shoehorning their libel actions into pri-
vacy claims.  No matter what the future holds for libel (and, poten-
tially, privacy) tourism, the Draft Defamation Act is likely to be just 
one of the first of many domestic legislative efforts in the 2010s to 
address the regulation of speech in the international context.  
 
